Product Description

A Military History of the English Civil War examines how the civil war was won, who fought for whom, and why it ended. With a straightforward style and clear chronology that enables readers to make their own judgements and pursue their own interests further, this original history provides a thorough critique of the reasons that have been cited for Parliament's victory and the King's defeat in 1645/46. It discusses the strategic options of the Parliamentary and Royalist commanders and councils of war and analyses the decisions they made, arguing that the King’s faulty command structure was more responsible for his defeat than Sir Thomas Fairfax's strategic flair. It also argues that the way that resources were used, rather than the resources themselves, explain why the war ended when it did.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #228657 in Books
• Published on: 2004-11-11
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 328 pages

Review

"A fascinating battle-by-battle account of the war between Cavaliers and

Roundheads...A superbly researched volume. "

- Nottingham Evening Post

From the Back Cover

How was the Civil War really won?

In a new military history of the Great Civil War Wanklyn and Jones draw on a wide range of contemporary sources to challenge commonly held ideas about the central determinant of the course of the English Revolution: Parliament’s victory.

Wanklyn and Jones conclude that Parliament’s victory was not inevitable: strategy and tactics won the war, not resources.

About the Author

Malcolm Wanklyn Is Emeritus Professor of Regional History at the University of Wolverhampton

Frank Jones teaches War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton

Customer Reviews

Essential Reading!
On seeing this title I suspected that it would be a tired retread of old secondary works, as so many books on this subject have been. However, I was pleasantly surprised to find that this is a major review of the first civil war in which many preconceptions and orthodoxies have been challenged. The authors argue convincingly that this was a war that could be lost in spite of superiority in resources; it was a war that needed to be won with competent and effective command and generalship as much anything.
I was taken by the emphasis on going back to the original sources which allowed new and interesting ways of analysing events to come to the surface. Too often we have taken previous works on face value or slip into speculation without evidence, something Wanklyn and Jones do not fall for.
I think the book is stronger on strategy than tactics - as a previous reviewer has highlighted - but it is nevertheless convincing and compelling. I think for many, to have their entrenched views undermined by scholars who value original sources rather than comfortable but unsubstantiated opinions, is a frightening experience, but ho hum, that is what history is about. (I have taught the subject for 35 years, so I have some insight here!)
I would thoroughly recommend this book to anyone wanting to understand why and how the war was won.

STRATEGY YES TACTICS NO!
Given the sub title, a seriously misleading book.

We are all awaiting a lengthy work on ECW military tactics so the author's claim raised my hopes- only to be dashed

The strategic overview is well argued and they come up with interesting views on the possibility of Royalist victory However in the back of my mind as I read the book was the total failure to consider fully the tactics ( and in some cases be quite wrong) and this, for me, has certainly impacted on their strategic theories. This is coupled with their dismissal of more recent works on the strategic side (They mention in passing Barratt's CAVALIERS but appear to ignore the new insights Reid put forward in the excellent ALL THE KING'S MEN for Royalist military strategic decisions). Disagree with yes, ignore, no.

The bibliography includes a wargaming book, a set of wargames rules & army lists-( not a bad idea as some recent rules have excellent overviews of current ECW military thinking) but these were written over 25 years ago and should been seen in the light of the authors' own comments that much has changed in ECW scholarship in the last 40 years. The only C17th drill manual mentioned Cruso's cavalry manual (reprinted several times)- not even Elton or Barriffe. Even titles from the osprey Campaign series are not cited Obviously the latest work on EDGEHILL is a bit too recent for the work but the claim that there has been no military biography of Cromwell, given that there have been 3 in the last 18 months, is a bit lax

The chapter on warfare is a brief overview of European warfare to the 1630's with the usual misunderstanding of how musketeers and fire tactics work. There is a brief mention of the differences between the Dutch & Swedish system but not how it would effect the tactics that the authors claim to be about to discuss.

Edgehill is described with absolutely NO indication that the each side used totally different tactical systems, surely essential for any analysis of the outcome. Even more worrying is an author's foot note about Essex & European tercios, that would appear to suggest that they know even less about military systems of the time than they have demonstrated to dated (page 54)

There is a section on Cavalry (but not infantry/Dragoon/artillery use in the field) that is obviously a precis of Jones' recent thesis that includes the assertion that only the Dutch system allowed for firing by rotation but the Swedish only went for 6 rank volley firing- and that Essex drew up his army in three large bodies!

I think I'll stop now. - If you are an avid ECW enthusiast with shelves groaning under books and the many military pamphlets available .. yes, go for it but if you are wanting a decent military history of the wars get ALL THE KING's ARMIES

David Cox
(Editor ENGLISH CIVIL WAR TIMES magazine