Product Description

This widely praised and much-discussed book explores how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoistswhether superpowers, businesses, or individualswhen there is no central authority to police their actions..

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #412539 in Books
• Published on: 1985-09-11
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 256 pages

Review
Starting from a social-scientific view of human nature which assumes that individuals behave egoistically, U. of Michigan political scientist Axelrod seeks to account for cooperative behavior - through computer games. Axelrod invited eminent game theorists from economics, psychology, and other fields to enter a tournament centered on the now-famous Prisoner's Dilemma: is it in the interests of each of two individuals to cooperate or not cooperate under specific circumstances? (Briefly, it is in the interests of both parties to claim innocence and receive a middling punishment than for one to tell on the other; but it is in the interests of each separately to tell, not knowing what the other will do.) Programs were submitted for this "iterated" Prisoner's Dilemma game - i.e., there would be a continuous sequence of moves rather than one single choice - and the winner turned out to be "TIT FOR TAT": a solution which said that after the first move, the second player would reciprocate. When pitted against more complicated strategies, the model of reciprocity always won. This leads Axelrod to the conclusion that in a context of repeated interaction, a pattern of behaving "nicely" will dominate a pattern of "meanness," and result in cooperative behavior. (Axelrod ran his tournament twice, the second time with many more participants and with all of them informed of the outcome of the first tournament; the TIT FOR TAT entry won again.) If non-game players intuitively respond that this is a strange way to state the obvious, Axelrod's turn to a historical example seen through TIT FOR TAT eyes shows that this is indeed the case. The example is WW I trench warfare and the well-known case of fraternization across the trenches. With the same soldiers facing each other day after day, some individuals on both sides adopted a strategy of not trying to shoot each other; only outsiders, not part of the game, broke the peace (e.g., lobbing artillery shells from a distance). Axelrod thinks his model explains the phenomenon, but it may just as well be said that the phenomenon explains the model. His lame suggestions for "players" in diplomacy and business are to get to know each other and to remember that the game will go on for a while. Then act nice, but retaliate immediately if the other side "defects," forcing them to be nice too. Not a breakthrough. (Kirkus Reviews)

Customer Reviews

Can cooperation emerge among egoistic individuums?
Sometimes, the individual benefit seems to conflict with the benefit of the community as a whole, even though the community includes this very individuum. One such example has been formulated as the Prisonner's Dilemma: two suspects, A and B, are arrested, and kept separated so that they cannot communicate. If they continue to cooperate, they will be both sentenced to one year. However, if suspect A cooperates, but suspect B defects, A is going to be sentenced to five years, and suspect B will be released. Vice versa, if B cooperates and A defects, A will be released and B sentenced to five years. Finally, if both defect, they will both be sentenced to three years each.

It is clear that the best solution for both of them is cooperation. On the other hand, each individual is also tempted to maximize his own individual benefit. And each of them benefits most if he decides to defect, which in turn brings the worst possible outcome for both (six years total). So one-shot Prisonner's Dilemma rarely leads to cooperation. Now, what if the very two chaps are later arrested again? Will they cooperate when given another chance? And if they know they will face the same situation every five years? Professor Axelrod tested the iterated Prisonner's Dilemma with computer programs, and investigated under which circumstances cooperation can emerge.

The book is nicely scattered with fragments of game theory and examples from world politics. All in all, as Richard Dawkins has commented in the foreword to the Penguin edition of this book, in breathes with optimism, and is a delight to read. Still, it has one problem, and actually shares it with Dawkins: the book reaches its climax right at the beginning. The book starts with a strong and very convincing idea, but later fails to keep the same pace of dynamic. The idea is splendid, but the structure of the book could be improved.

An "ah ha" type read. A game-theoretical analysis of how co-operation can defeat selfishness.
I have to admit this is not a riveting read. It is largely a factual description of experiments Axelrod carried out over a number of years, with a variety of experts competing to find the most successful tactics in games of iterated prisoner's dilemma.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma

However the outcome of the research is truly eye-opening and fascinating. Unlike a single round game of prisoner's dilemma (where co-operation is, to say the least, dangerous), the most successful tactics were to co-operate rather than act selfishly, unless that co-operative behaviour was abused by the other player (in which case neither player would do very well). Axelrod also shows how co-operation can spread through a network squeezing out selfish behaviour.

You know the book has to be worth a read when Richard Dawkin's, author of the Selfish Gene, writes in the introduction:

"THIS IS A book of optimism. But it is believable, realistic optimism... As Darwinians we start pessimistically by assuming deep selfishness, pitiless indifference to suffering, ruthless heed to individual success. And yet from such warped beginnings, something that is in effect, if not necessarily in intention, close to amicable brotherhood and sisterhood can come. This is the uplifting message of Robert Axelrod's remarkable book."

There we are, a book to save Dawkins from himself - has to be good.

A groundbreaking study on effective cooperation
Every so often a book comes along that is so groundbreaking it changes the popular worldview. This book, written in 1984 by Robert Axelrod, is just such a seminal work, an original analysis that changed the way experts view cooperation. Its ramifications apply to individuals, organizations, countries and even nonthinking - but nevertheless cooperative - biological life forms, such as bacteria. Axelrod based his book on the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, a classic game created in 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher of the Rand Corporation. Canadian mathematician Albert W. Tucker added the prison sentence payoffs and gave the game its colorful name. Players have two choices: cooperation or betrayal. Axelrod organized two repeating Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments played by computer programs devised by game theorists, scientists and other experts. His analysis of the tournaments' results confirmed that cooperation is always a better long-term strategy than betrayal and, thus, evolution has favored it. This book, based on that analysis, has become a true classic. getAbstract suggests that anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of cooperation should start by reading this pivotal, illuminating study.