Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #5791 in Books
• Published on: 2005-10-04
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 280 pages

Synopsis
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife", Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl - a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq - considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl - the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass - argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict.

Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.

Customer Reviews

A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.

John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.

It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.

Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.

Not What I Expected
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.

Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.

For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.