Product Description

In 1775, George Washington took command of a ragbag army of American insurgents and took on the might of the British Army. Through a brilliant campaign of ambush and indirect attacks, he finally succeeded in defeating the greatest military power in the world, and won America its independence. Today it is the USA that is the world's dominant superpower. When they entered Iraq in 2003 they made the same mistakes that the British made over 200 years ago: they underestimated the popular hostility against them, and believed they could fight a widespread insurgence using troops trained for conventional warfare. They are beginning to learn, as the British did, that sheer military power is not enough. As a former Director of UK Special Forces and Commander of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, Michael Rose is uniquely experienced in counter-insurgency warfare. In this hard-hitting book he explains the principles of guerrilla warfare as used in the American War of Independence, and shows how those same principles have been adopted by the insurgents in Iraq.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #386548 in Books
• Published on: 2007-04-26
• Original language: English
• Binding: Hardcover
• 224 pages

Economist
'absorbing'

Review
'absorbing' (Economist )

'Rose is shrewd and coruscating on America's (and Britain's) mistaken assumptions and tactical stupidity in Iraq...' (Rod Liddle THE SUNDAY TIMES )

'My only regret about this lucid, elegantly written history, is that Rose didn't write it sooner.' (David Robinson THE SCOTSMAN )

David Robinson, THE SCOTSMAN
'My only regret about this lucid, elegantly written history, is that Rose didn't write it sooner.'

Customer Reviews

A must for Army Officers and Historians
Michael Rose, or to give him his correct title - General Sir Michael Rose KCB CBE DSO QGM - the author of this absorbing hard hitting publication is no stranger to modern warfare! Having initially seeing active-service in Malaysia and Oman, he later commanded the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment at the time of both the London Iranian Embassy siege and then the Falkland's War. He later assumed command of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia and therefore I honestly believe he is well qualified to write this excellent volume, in which he not only sets the scene in the historical context, but also explains and compares the similarities in the basic principles of guerrilla warfare employed by the American Revolutionary armies in 1775 and the tactics employed by insurgents in both Iraqi and in other areas of modern conflict today.
Amazingly as we now know, even with a "ram-shackle" army of insurgents, Washington's brilliant campaign of 1775 worked and his indirect attacks and ambush tactics were contributory factors in leading him and his army into defeating one of the greatest powers in the world at that time. Proof alone that military might then, may not as now always be enough to succeed against well motivated and determined enemy forces.!
Today the USA that is the world's dominant superpower, when they entered Iraq in 2003 they seem to have made the same mistakes that the British Army made over 200 years ago against Washington's troops - they too underestimated the hostility against them and believed they could fight widespread insurgence using troops trained only in conventional warfare. They are now however beginning to learn the expensive lesson as the British did all those years ago, that sheer military power is not enough.

This hard-backed, value for money and what some may consider to be long overdue volume will, I feel, be invaluable for any serving army officer about to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. Anyone with an interest in the American War of Independence and modern history will find it a fascinating read too.

A compelling comparison
The quote by Lord Chatham in 1777 "If I were an American...while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I would never lay down my arms, never-never-never" resonates through this book. It is a carefully constructed comparison of the military and socio-political tactics employed by the American Revolutionaries against the British, and the problems being encountered by the USA in its various global conflicts today. For those of us who believe that history holds many of the answers it comes as no great surprise that the strategy and tactics that helped free the American colonists of a foreign power should work equally well today in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these two places since 1841 the pattern has be depressingly similar for any invader. Michael Rose makes his points in a well crafted examination of the eternal problem of attempting to deal with a well motivated and organised insurgency at long distance. This book sits well with the lessons of the British experience in the region during the last 150 years, and makes a compelling point about the difficulty of imposing solutions on a non compliant people, and the wisdom of reviewing strategy in changing circumstances.

Mike McCarthy
Editor, "The Battle Guide"
Guild of Battlefield Guides

Useful study of the futility of counter-insurgency wars
General Sir Michael Rose has written a most important book. His account of Washington's War, the war of American independence from the British Empire, is dotted with illuminating comparisons with the Iraq war. Both wars were, for the occupier, unwinnable and counter-productive (Afghanistan too).

Once a counter-insurgency war is started, the occupier cannot win. "Conventional military forces can never defeat a national movement of resistance, as the American Revolutionary War so well demonstrates."

Rose aims "to point out where politicians decide to ignore the lessons of history and lead their countries into ill-judged wars." Incompetence, hubris, ignorance, lies and delusions are all effects of war, not causes. Bush and Blair did not `ignore' the lessons of France in Algeria or the USA in Vietnam; their class interests drove them to repeat those disasters.

Rose writes, "The failure of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to understand the limitations of military force in combating terrorism undoubtedly stems from their misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the wars in the Balkans that took place between 1992 and 1999. ... In this wholly inaccurate analysis, it was the bombing of the Serbs in September 1995 that brought peace at Dayton and it was the bombing of Yugoslavia that removed Milosevic from power in 1999. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth." The Serbs had agreed to negotiate a peace settlement before the NATO attack and the Serbs voted Milosevic out of power in the 2001 election.

The use of overwhelming military force is central to a general war but `inherently counter-productive' in a counter-insurgency war. "For in such wars, winning the support of the population is always the key objective, not seizing ground or destroying an army." Tactical successes, i.e. killing lots of people, do not translate into strategic gains. More troops, more force, more invasions cannot bring victory.

The Coalition's stated aims in Iraq - democracy, rebuilding, never mind victory - are, he writes, `impossible to achieve'. "Within Iraq, the US-led occupation force has become more an obstacle than a help towards establishing peace and order." He shows how the war is damaging the struggle against terrorism. He refutes the domino theory applied to Vietnam: "The fear that chaos will result in the Middle East following a US withdrawal from Iraq is, of course, equally groundless."

Some want to continue the war because they fear accusations of being unpatriotic. Rose notes acerbically, "Like the British parliamentarians of the eighteenth century, it seems that many people prefer to see more soldiers lose their lives than risk their reputations."

The Duke of Wellington said that the most difficult task facing any general was "To know when to retreat and to dare to do it." We should demand that the occupiers retreat.