Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #34032 in Books
• Published on: 2007-05-03
• Original language: English
• Binding: Paperback
• 512 pages

The New York Times
`Scorching ... absolutely essential'

Sunday Telegraph, Books of the Year
Fiasco's political impact has been immense

Evening Standard
Possibly the most powerful critique of Anglo-American security and
foreign policy in our time

Customer Reviews

Damming indictment of the war in Iraq
Thomas Ricks pulls no punches in his account of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq. Ricks begins with the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, one which was unsatisfying to men like Paul Wolfowitz. Throughout the 1990s, this group of neoconservatives kept up a steady drumbeat against Iraq, while the election of George W. Bush in 2000 gave some of them - most notably Wolfowitz and his former deputy 'Scooter' Libby - positions of power within government. Yet Ricks argues that they were on the losing end of the debate to intervene in Iraq until al-Qaeda's attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks created an opening to reshape foreign policy, one that Ricks sees the neoconservatives as taking full advantage of the opportunity presented to push the administration towards a more aggressive posture internationally, one in which an attack on Iraq would be at the forefront.

With the decision to go to war essentially made by early 2002, the next question was how to win it. Here Ricks places responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon, which not only believed their unrealistically rosy predictions about what a war would look like, but also insisted that U.S. military planners adopt war plans which fit these expectations, even if the consequences flew in the face of experience and accepted military doctrine. Ricks sees a lot of buck-passing, as everyone stifled their doubts and worked with what they had. Making matters worse was the plan for war itself. Anticipating the type of large-scale armor clash that the Army had been planning for since the Cold War, it imposed a strategy that would prove damaging in retrospect.

None of this seemed to matter in March and April of 2003, as U.S. armored columns roared into Baghdad as if winning some sort of great race. In the aftermath of the capture of the Iraqi capital, the administration celebrated it as the triumphant climax of the war. Yet Ricks views it as only the first battle. Throughout this point, he details the missed opportunities, faulting the blunders of the Pentagon planners, the commanders in the field, and the new head of the occupation authority, Paul Bremmer, for crippling the chance for a peaceful occupation. By the summer of 2003 Iraq had reached a tipping-point, after which an insurgency increasingly challenged U.S. control of the country. Ricks finds the cause for this at many levels, from the willful blindness of the political leadership to the neglect of the Army of the lessons of Vietnam, all of which had a ripple effect in the thousands of encounters between U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians. By the spring of 2004 the situation had deteriorated into a level of warfare that the U.S. military had not faced in generations, and while a new set of commanders have attempted to adjust in response, Ricks is pessimistic about the prospects of achieving the type of hopeful outcome so confidently promised in the run-up to the war.

Ricks' book is a powerful and damming indictment of the conduct of the invasion of occupation of Iraq. Relying on thousands of documents and interviews with participants at all levels, he reveals in full detail the decisions and actions that have brought America and Iraq to the current situation there. Few groups come out of it with their reputations intact - the military, the civilian leadership, the media, and the Iraqis all receive a share of the responsibility for the mess described in the title. While a fuller picture would have been enriched Ricks's analysis further still - he covers the roles of both the international coalition and the private contractors in passing only - his is nonetheless the best account available of the ongoing crisis in Iraq, one that is required reading for anyone seeking to understand how we got to where we are today.

Beggars belief
My wife saw this book and assumed from the title that it was an Andy McNab-esque action adventure romp. If only. I had always assumed that modern wars are started for a reason, that modern armies go into battle knowing what they are trying to do and that politicians at least think about what happens next, before they order the tanks and soldiers in. Not in Iraq.

Fiasco is entirely centred on the "American military adventure in Iraq", and it unveils clear and serious failings in the Army - an institution that was ill structured, ill trained and ill equipped to fight a counter insurgency semiwar (campaign? conflict?)

But it is the civilian leadership who come out worst of all. They ignored the facts and the advice of their own soldiers. They had no plan for what would happen after the war. They wanted the Marines to shoot up Fallujah so they did not look weak in the American press. They assumed they'd be welcomed with open arms and never thought "what if we'er not?" Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Bush - ideological, blind to conflicting viewpoints, deaf to bad news.

In places, what happened defies belief.

So, will you be interested? As an analysis of why things in Iraq have gone the way they have, and what the prospects for the future really are - this is fascinating. And as an insight into the men running the US at the moment - this is very frightening. Recommended

Ricks gets it right...Detailed, sourced, and factual accounting of disastrous US involvement in Iraq
Thomas Ricks was always a good writer, but was best known for his work at the Washington Post until his excellent book "Making the Corps" hit shelves. It was a book full of rich detail and honest, factual conclusions. With "Fiasco" Ricks outdoes himself and dozens of writers who have tackled the quagmire that is the Iraq War. Drawing from hundreds of interviews, press conferences, and policy papers, Ricks reveals the progression of mistakes and bad decisions that turned a winnable war into a quicksand-like mess of epic proportions, without cloaking himself in partisan colors.

From CENTCOM to the Pentagon and White House, initial planning for the war took on a bare-bones, best case scenario. Rumsfeld and his sycophantic policy advisors Wolfowitz and Feith believed the Iraqis would welcome the US in, and few troops would be needed; they weren't afraid to bully their opinions into policy or twist vague intelligence to fit their theories. They believed that the war would end, a new Iraqi government would form, and America could walk away with a shiny new victory over the forces of evil. Any soldier worth their salt could tell you, though, you plan for the worst possible scenarios, so you are ready for any eventuality. While Rumsfeld and gang take some deserved hard hits, Ricks makes the interesting assertation that President Bush was not obsessed with going to war with Saddam as other authors have claimed, but that going to war with Iraq was a necessary next step after Afghanistan. The President comes across as a disinterested observer. I personally disagree with this assessment, but Ricks argues his case well.

Though the invasion was successful and fast, the fall of Baghdad didn't bring about the end; in fact the months that followed were merely the portent to the insurgency. Lacking any kind of cohesive plans for the post-war Iraq, both civilian and military stumbled their way forward. Ricks discusses many of Paul Bremer's horrendous decision making as head of the CPA, most notably the dissolving of the Iraqi Army which created a ready-made force of angry, unemployed young men with military training and experience. He addresses how the Army and Marines philosophy of overwhelming with superior firepower didn't adapt to the new reality of counter-insurgency. Ricks also points out how slow commanders in the field were to realize they needed to fight a counter-insurgency war and praises those like Marine General Mattis and Col.H.R. McMaster who did.

The book reads fast, despite some awkward grammatical structuring, and actually contains a extensive list of footnotes and source material used in writing the book, something James Risen should have paid more attention to. Ricks' sources give this book credibility, as does Ricks' refusal to sling mud for mud's sake. Ricks does slip a bit with a tendency to over-focus on negative incidents by units like the 4th ID and 1st Marines, casting a negative light on a division or regiment rather than the individuals involved. Overall though, he is incredibly fair and honest in describing what truly has become a fiasco, and this book should be required reading at all levels of the government.

A.G. Corwin
St.Louis, MO