Product Description

An insight into moral skepticism of the 20th century. The author argues that our every-day moral codes are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #153992 in Books
• Published on: 1990-08-30
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 256 pages

About the Author
John Leslie Mackie (1917-1981) was a philosopher who made significant contributions to the fields of ethics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion. A professor of philosophy at the universities of Sydney, Otago, New Zealand, and York, he was elected a fellow of the University of Oxford in 1967 and to the British Academy in 1974.

Customer Reviews

brilliant
This densely argued little book provides what is perhaps the most influential formulation of moral skepticism of the 20th century in the form of what Mackie calls an 'error theory' of moral judgment. Mackie asserts that there is a deep and pervasive error in ordinary moral thought, in that it postulates the existence of properties and entities which cannot be part of a sensible, scientific ontology. After an elaboration of his fundamental negative thesis, Mackie goes on to develop a proto-contractual account of morality that presumably can be affirmed without making the error that haunts ordinary moral thought and the philosophical tradition (although I must add that the second part of the book stands in a somewhat awkward relation to the first). Obligatory reading for anyone interested in the foundations of ethics.

Fascinating
Mackie is ever-provocative, just see his 'Miracle of Theism' for proof, and here he attacks morality. Our every-day moral codes, he argues, are an 'error theory' based on the presumption of moral facts which, he persuasively argues, don't exist. His refutation of such facts is based on their metaphysical 'queerness' and the observation of cultural relativity. I can't say whether he's 'right', but if you're interested in the objectivity (or otherwise) of moral standards, this is a recommended read.

A solid contribution to ethical thinking
I picked this book up in Waterstones as an adjunct to another book on professional ethics in my field (software engineering). Once I had started to read it I just kept going, ever more engaged, to the end.

Skepticism has its limits and wielded by less than agile minds can be a very blunt tool. Here, however, Mackie presents a convincing (at least to me) argument against the entire fabric of moral precepts by elucidating not so much their contradictions as their incoherence from a philosophical viewpoint.

Yet this is not a crude argument for moral relativism. Rather, Mackie simply argues that if moral precepts won't do, we need to replace them with something that will. To fill this gap he proposes an ethics based on individual rights and obligations. There is nothing new in this idea for it goes back to the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, Mackie offers it in a clear form without arbitrary prescriptions for the societies in which moral actors live. Thereby he avoids the absurdities propounded by various American thinkers (notably the psychotic-libertarian school represented by Nozick) and that is this book's great strength.

Mackie left me admiring him for having the guts not to be radical but simply to admit that practical ethics does not work unless it has the pragmatism to make frequent sanity checks upon itself.

For its plain words and good sense I cannot recommend this book highly enough.