Product Description

Masters and Commanders describes how four titanic figures shaped the grand strategy of the West during the Second World War. Each was exceptionally tough-willed and strong minded, and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet each knew that he had to win at least two of the others over in order to get his strategy adopted. The book traces the mutual suspicion and admiration, the rebuffs and the charm, the often explosive disagreements and wary reconciliations which resulted.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #5546 in Books
• Published on: 2009-05-28
• Original language: English
• Binding: Paperback
• 736 pages

Review
'This is an important book which ! sees Mr Roberts lay claim to the title of Britain's finest contemporary military historian' Economist 'A masterpiece of robust historical analysis, steeped in scholarship and alive to every nuance of personality' Daily Express 'His interpretation of British/US strategic relations is unlikely to be superseded' - Vernon Bogdanor, Financial Times

Review
'The strength of Masters and Commanders lies in the power of the narrative and the fascinating detail used to construct it ... Roberts has a shrewd grasp of the ins and outs of decision making'

`This is an important book which ... sees Mr Roberts lay claim to the title of Britain's finest contemporary military historian.'

Review
'Couched in elegant prose, this book is a masterpiece of robust historical analysis, steeped in scholarship and alive to every nuance of personality'

Customer Reviews

Comments by Michael Calum Jacques, author of '1st Century Radical'.
This fascinating book, thick with historical data and insights, makes a riveting read. Whilst having no wish to quarrel with previous reviewers, for this reviewer, the book's strength is to be found within the all too rare combination of the elucidation of pertinent details and the subsequent compilation and marshaling of this data in order to reach coherent conclusions. The hi-lighting of detailed minutiae is only of secondary value, it would appear, if any historical advances are unable to be procured from it. Fortunately, this fastidiously researched volume abounds in both.

It is a lengthy read, at round 670 pages, and is at times dense in the chronicled information it conveys. It is an honest read, too, and this reviewer proffers that an alternative title could well have been formed along the lines of 'How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke very nearly didn't Win the War in the West'! Indeed, some readers - especially those none too conversant with the internecine bickering that went on in and around the corridors of power prior to the D-Day Landings, for example - might be quite take aback at the apparent abrasiveness and the various fractious dealings which formed part of the staple diet of 'Allied' conferences, rhetoric and debate.

This reviewer would want to take issue with one or two points in previous press reviews which have suggested that, whilst Andrew Roberts' book remains a immense achievement, it establishes and thus contributes only slight, minor historical detail to the ongoing research into the WWII fray. Surely this is both to ignore key passages and sections of the book and to miss the point. Firstly, from an historical perspective, Roberts has successfully revealed a number of new 'primary' sources (in the forms of 'oral' reports and written chronicles, diaries et al) and, secondly, this information helps us to somewhat 'recalibrate' certainly, and possibly even to reassess the methods and the roles of a number of key policymakers. Again, this would appear to illustrate the author's successful achievement in having interpreted the mass of available data and having translated this into 'applied history'.

There is plenty of historical meat within this work and it should appeal to the interested/well-informed general reader on the one hand and the historian (and possibly even the military tactician) on the other. IThis reviewer found the sections relating to the Allies' 'sweep' across Europe especially interesting and I must congratulate Andrew Roberts on handling the material (which remains a sensitive substance within certain quarters and factions) very well, with confidence and authority. Narratives pertaining to the reticence with which Brooke approached the invasion of France, the mood swings and what amounted to the basic pessimism of Churchill et al will never sit easily with some, yet to gloss over delicate topics such as these would be to gloss over history and to, ultimately misrepresent it. As Quiller-Couch put it, we sometimes have to be prepared 'to murder our darlings' ... occasionally these need to be historical or conceptual little treasures, too!

In a nutshell, this volume accomplishes a great deal, to the mind of this reviewer, at least. It is eminently readable, dense with data, and offers measurable and definite conclusions based on the material within. As ever, this work, too, will now be subject to the rigours of historic analysis itself. This reviewer suspects that it will fair pretty well.

Michael Calum Jacques (author of '1st Century Radical: the shadowy origins of the man who became known as Jesus Christ')

The National Reviews So Far
Reviews of Masters and Commanders

`Writing with clarity and elegance, Mr Roberts conveys how his four principals and their armies of aides and staff officers thrashed out the formulae for victory. This is an important book which, in its layered references to Waterloo, the Crimea and the Somme, sees Mr Roberts lay claim to the title of Britain's finest contemporary military historian.'
The Economist

`Despite eschewing the visceral drama of the battlefield for the less deadly, if no less hard-fought, debates of various Allied conferences, cabinets and committees, Roberts has produced a surprisingly gripping read. He has marshalled his material superbly and his warts-and-all assessment of his four subjects is invariable spot-on. Exhaustively researched and judiciously written, with a gimlet eye for telling detail, this may be his finest book yet.'
Saul David, Sunday Telegraph

`In Masters and Commanders, Roberts offers us a compelling analysis of American and British strategy during the war. He also tells a profoundly human story - of two soldiers who loyally served their masters, only to be each denied at the end the prize that would have made one of them world famous.'
Laurence Rees, Sunday Times

`Roberts displays a profound understanding of the interactions between strategy and politics, and his interpretation of British/US strategic relations between 1941 and 1945 is unlikely to be superseded.'
Prof Vernon Bogdanor, Financial Times

`Couched in elegant prose, this book is a masterpiece of robust historical analysis, steeped in scholarship and alive to every nuance of personality. Roberts re-evaluates each of the masters and commanders with scrupulous fairness.'
Christopher Silvester, Daily Express

`The author has crafted a masterly and fresh interpretation of the grand strategy of World War II. Roberts's pen-portraits, with their wealth of amusing and often acerbic anecdotes, reveal the evolution of that strategy by the master statesmen.'
John Crossland, Daily Mail

`The strength of Masters and Commanders lies in the power of the narrative and the fascinating detail used to construct it. Roberts has exploited a rich mine of private papers to fill in missing parts of the story, and although there is little new to be learned about the long strategic arguments between the British and the Americans over the best way to defeat Hitler, there is a lot to learn about the way that argument took place. Roberts has a shrewd grasp of the ins and outs of decision making.'
Prof Richard Overy, Literary Review

`Marshal Foch famously said that he had "less respect for Napoleon, now that I know what a coalition is". The high quality of the leadership of the coalition Andrew Roberts so expertly describes was a decisive factor in their success.'
Conrad Black, Mail on Sunday

`A wonderful page-turner, a really good read.'
Chris Patten, Start the Week

The Best
Beware, this book is not a history of WW II, nor does it deal with "the operational art" of battles and campaigns.

The subject of this book is British and U.S. grand strategy in WW II, and how it was decided upon. Andrew Roberts analyses and describes much source material, some of it previously locked away in archives. In particular he has consulted verbatim reports of Cabinet and General Staff meetings.

Robert's book is clearly structured and very well written. A prerequisite for full enjoyment of the book is some knowledge of WWII history, but if you have that, in this area of WW II studies, this book is simply the best.