Product Description

On 16 May 1940 an emergency meeting of the French High Command was called at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. The German army had broken through the French lines on the River Meuse at Sedan and elsewhere, only five days after launching their attack. Churchill, who had been telephoned by Prime Minister Reynaud the previous evening to be told that the French were beaten, rushed to Paris to meet the French leaders. The mood in the meeting was one of panic and despair; there was talk of evacuating Paris. Churchill asked Gamelin, the French Commander in Chief, 'Where is the strategic reserve?' 'There is none,' replied Gamelin. This exciting book by Julian Jackson, a leading historian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greatest bastions of the Western Allies, and thus to a dramatic new phase of the Second World War. The search for scapegoats for the most humiliating military disaster in French history began almost at once: were miscalculations by military leaders to blame, or was this an indictment of an entire nation? Using eyewitness accounts, memoirs, and diaries, Julian Jackson recreates, in gripping detail, the intense atmosphere and dramatic events of these six weeks in 1940, unravelling the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question of whether the fall of France was inevitable.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #142016 in Books
• Published on: 2004-04-22
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 296 pages

The Times
"first class, authoritative account...an intelligent, lucid history."

Review
first class, authoritative account...an intelligent, lucid history. (The Times )

Contemporary Review
"It should become required reading"

Customer Reviews

Do the French really surrender regularly?
Much has been written about various aspects of World War II, but books continue to come out. Some do re-evaluations using new information, some take a different look at old information and try to show it in a new light. Julian Jackson has written a very interesting book on the German invasion of France in 1940, called (simply enough) The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940. In it, Jackson attempts to show his version of why France fell, and whether or not it was inevitable. Were the Germans just too powerful? Was the new Blitzkrieg warfare just too much for the incompetent French soldiers? Jackson uses personal memoirs, eyewitness accounts, and diaries to provide this vivid account of six weeks of hell. Not only that, but he places the fall in historical context. Put all together, and it's a fascinating book.

First, Jackson tells the story of the invasion. He breaks this down into four narrative chapters that explore this from a different angle. The first one contains the military aspects of the defeat. The second looks at the relations between France and its allies, mainly Britain (though it does examine other countries, such as the support pact with Poland). This examines how the British and French looked at each other, along with how they cooperated in war (and how they fought amongst themselves as well). The third chapter looks at the political aspects of the defeat, while the fourth looks at the French people. Then Jackson brings them all together, looking at how they all relate to each other, and shows how each one can be seen as part of the defeat, but yet none of them can be singled out as the main cause. Finally, Jackson looks at the consequences of the defeat, including how it coloured French thinking for years to come, even reaching as far forward as today. Much of French foreign policy has referred back to this time in their history.

I was really impressed with the way Jackson told the story. His writing is very evocative and his use of sources from memoirs of generals and politicians to the common soldier is extremely well done. I have read a few books on this aspect of the war (or that have included it, anyway), but never have I heard from the soldier's point of view. This is becoming the norm in World War II history books recently (see An Army at Dawn), and I like it. I think it gives us a better picture of warfare and how it affects the soldiers who are fighting it, rather than just dry strategy and tactics. That's not the only thing that's good about it, though. Since Jackson is examining the defeat from multiple sides, it wouldn't have been surprising to see him tell the story of the invasion and then look at the other aspects of it, thus having some narrative repetition. Jackson avoids this, seamlessly linking the chapters so that they tell a continuous story, even as he looks at the different points.

The most interesting part of the book is when Jackson is looking at the different causes of the loss. The standard is to blame the horrible French military, calling them cowards and (as the stereotype goes) saying how easily the French surrender. Mosier's The Blitzkrieg Myth places a large portion of the blame on the British. Jackson shows, however, that the main reason was the bad intelligence that the French had, which caused them to send their best troops against a German feint. He takes pains to point out that there was no one specific cause, however. He agrees with Mosier that the British pulling back didn't help, and he mentions the refusal of the Belgians to coordinate defense strategy with the French and the British until after Germany invaded (they had declared neutrality). The coordination between British and French forces was not the best either. Thus, the situation was more complex then many claim. The French soldier fought with élan when he didn't feel abandoned by his superiors.

I also found the historical context fascinating. Jackson doesn't just tell the reader about what happened, but he examines the next 50 years as well, and how the Fall affected France. French historians still don't talk about it much, and when they do discuss it, it's more of a condemnation of the Third Republic government before the war than anything else. Jackson's book does much to alleviate that problem. To many, the Fall of France was an inevitable result based on the "decadence" of France in the pre-war era. Jackson refutes that brilliantly, saying that the war was actually quite winnable if executed properly.

It's hard to find any real faults with this book. While nothing is perfect, any problems I had with the book are so niggling as to be unmentionable. It is a very short book (only 249 pages, not including notes and bibliography), but it feels deep. I could have hoped for even a bit more depth, but Jackson uses the scale marvelously, packing a lot of information and evaluation into these 249 pages. There is no padding, and little extraneous information included. Between The Fall of France and The Blitzkrieg Myth, I've found some fascinating short history books, and as long as they don't read like summaries, I hope that this is a trend.

If you are at all interested in World War II, this is a book that you should pick up.

The Fall of France
This is a first rate text with an excellent balance of narrative and analysis. Without diminishing the tradegy of June 1940, the book explores in an even-handed fashion the folly, inertia, complacency and internecine scape-goating that caused, and was ultimately a consequence of, the fall of France. Professor Jackson's book is immensely readable, but that does not diminish the quality of the detail which it sets out.

A concise and convincing analysis
This book provides an excellent explanation of how France came to capitulate in 1940 within a matter of weeks. It is structured in 3 parts: the first provides the military events up to the German breakthrough at Sedan; the second looks at how French politics and national feelings after the First World War left France ill-prepared for another European war; and the third section looks at the consequences and "what ifs". The military history stops at the French collapse on the Ardennes, so omitting the events in the North that ended in the Dunkirk evacuation. A summary of what happened after the Sedan breakthrough would have been useful (the essays collected in "The Battle for France and Flanders Sixty Years On", edited by Brian Bond, are a good ancillary read on the military aspects). The second part of the book rather sags, as it contains a long excursus on Franco-British relations during the inter-war period which while an important part of the story is also the least interesting. However, this book is a thought-provoking, interesting read and the author deals with the historiography of the defeat extremely well. Jackson convincingly puts to bed the Gaullist idea that the interwar Third Republic was a disaster for France and shows how France's national consciousness was dominated by the slaughter of the 1914-18 war. The simple fact was that at every level France was unable to endure again the sacrifices of the First World War, an attitude that is easily misunderstood by those countries that were not themselves among the 1914-18 battlefields. Jackson also reminds us that the fall of France was the event that turned the war into a world war rather than a European one, as Italy and then Japan seized their chances to pick off allied interests.

Together with Jackson's "France - the Dark Years" and Gildea's "Marianne in Chains", this book now gives us an outstanding and up-to-date English-language trilogy on French history from 1920-1945.