Product Description

What is required for something to be evidence for an hypothesis? The distinguished philosopher of science, Peter Achinstein, introduces here a basic concept of "potential" evidence which is characterized using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is applied to a range of philosophical and historical issues, including the "grue" and "raven" paradoxes; whether explanation or predictions provide more evidential weight; scientific discovery; whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for molecules; and whether J.J. Thomson really discovered the electron.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #3408169 in Books
• Published on: 2001-10
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 304 pages

Review
Peter Achinstein has written a book for anyone who wonders what has happened to confirmation theory and the interpretation of probability among philosophers of science since the golden age of Hempel, Carnap, and Reichenbach ... This book has a rare combination of analytical clarity and historical sensibility and could only have been written by someone who has been thinking about these issues for several decades ... notable too for providing a lucid account of the main positions onevidence and probability available today that will be accessible to students (and others) not familiar with the territory ... Achinstein's project is richly executed, with many fringe benefits. Isis