Product Description

When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, the Nixon-Kissenger strategy of detente, and now a comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbechev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end. He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #344579 in Books
• Published on: 2005-06-23
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 512 pages

Customer Reviews

An authoritative overview of U.S. foreign policy
I do not believe there is a finer overview of post-World War II American foreign policy than this important book. As a work of history as opposed to political science, it is well-suited for any reader who cares about America's relationship with the world. Gaddis explains containment as it was originally envisioned by George Kennan and then goes on to show the fluctuations between symmetrical and asymmetrical policies up through the Carter administration. He first describes each policy stance--its antecedents, influences, and applications--then describes the applicability of that policy in reality. He shows how Kennan's conception of containment was quickly lost in the enactment of NSC 68 by the Truman administration and the U.S. involvement in Korea. He describes Eisenhower's "New Look" as a shift back to a policy wherein America drew distinctions between conflicts it would and would not react to, relying heavily on the nuclear option in an all-or-nothing containment strategy. Then he dissects the "flexible response" policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ascribing much importance to their Keynesian economic outlooks in convincing them that America could response to any and all threats while still growing the domestic economy. After the debacle of Vietnam, Gaddis does a wonderful job of describing the détente policies of Nixon and Kissinger.

The most important conclusion he draws is that economic realities and domestic politics seemingly play an integral part in America's oscillating policies over time. To be more exact, the perception of means largely steers policy. Eisenhower adopted an asymmetrical policy, relying on the nuclear threat while decreasing the nation's conventional forces, because he feared the effects of overspending. Kennedy wanted to distance himself from the previous adminstration, and his liberal economic outlook convinced him that the American economy could be grown and controlled in such a way as to provide the funds for increasing both military and domestic spending, which would allow him to meet any threat any where at any time. This symmetrical policy, continued by Johnson, led America into a war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. Nixon, naturally, wanted to distance himself from Johnson, and he also faced great constraints in public perception and Congressional distaste for increased military spending--under such constraints, he and Kissinger decided on a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, a policy that was effective to some degree but was ineffective in many ways (especially lesser regional conflicts). Carter's foreign policy was a blundering tightwalk between symmetry and asymmetry and was basically no policy at all. Gaddis is fairly objective in his assessment of the oscillating course of foreign policy, pointing out the successes as well as the failures of each strategy. He does not discuss every single incident because it would be impossible to cover everything in detail, so some issues I was interested in, such as Greek policy in 1948, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev's shoe-thumping speeach at the U.N., the Iranian hostage crisis, to name a few, were barely mentioned, but his overall synthesis and communication of ideas is illuminating. I learned a great deal from reading this book. I only wish the book had been written more recently than 1982, so it could have concluded with a study of how Ronald Reagan actually won the Cold War.

An excellent and comprehensive survey
The attitudes and policies that the United States adopted toward the Soviet Union from the Second World War to the early 1980s was, John Lewis Gaddis argues in this comprehensive survey, by no means consistent. The book charts the course of the policies of each of the different US administrations throughout the period, scrutinising their assumptions and principles for dealing with the Soviet Union, before going on to examine how each attempted to translate these into practice. He begins his account by examining the strategies advocated by George F. Kennan - a senior figure within the US State Department in 1945 - who believed that US security would best be preserved not through a programme of massive rearmament, but ensuring that Europe recovered from the war, making it less susceptible to communism and capable of shouldering its own defence burden. From the 1950 onwards, though, each American administration disregarded Kennan's advice, and attempted to meet the Soviets from a position of armed strength. Gaddis argues, though, that even then their were distinct differences in approach; in particular he distinguishes between symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches to containment. A symmetrical approach envisioned a proportionate response to any Soviet approach; an asymmetrical strategy envisioned 'massive retaliation'. The book's main strength is that, in setting up this analytical framework, Gaddis is able to systematically examine a large and extremely complex chunk of history. Written by the US's foremost cold war historian, the book superbly balances a detailed narrative with a judicious assessment of the various administrations' policies. Although this survey is now almost twenty years old, it remains the most comprehensive account of American national security policy during the cold war.