Product Description

Despite the importance of warfare in the collapse of the Roman Empire, there is no modern, comprehensive study available. This book discusses the practice of warfare in Europe, from both Roman and barbarian perspectives, during the late fourth and early fifth centuries. It analyses the military practices and capabilities of the Romans and their northern enemies at policy, strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and covers civil wars, sieges, and naval warfare. Dr Elton analyses in depth the issue of barbarization, and shows that it did not affect the efficiency of the Roman army. Other sections of the book discuss organization, fortifications, and equipment.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #447395 in Books
• Published on: 1997-10-23
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 336 pages

Customer Reviews

A superb assessment of the late Roman army
This book offers a great insight into the workings and fighting capabilities of the late roman army. It is rigorous, well-argumented and not afraid of taking the academic establishment head on when it comes to dispelling several "myths" about the late roman army and the empire.

For instance, it has become common place to say that the barbarization of the late roman army led to a decline of its effectiveness on the field. Elton correctly poses the question of why, if a "barbarized" army was ineffective, the Romans did not stop recruiting barbarians; indeed, the Eastern Empire, which survived, continued to recruit barbarians well into the 6th century. The rationale for using barbarian troops must be searched beyond the trite arguments that the romans had become "corrupt", and Elton sheds lights on what business consultants call the "make" (ie raise additional roman troops) versus "buy" (ie "rent" barbarians for a specific campaign) tradeoff. On the same topic, Elton also proves that there is no clear trend towards barbarization of the higher ranks. More generally, Elton proves convincingly that there is no evidence that the late roman army was ineffective. In my opinion, arguing that the army's inability to stop the invasions is a proof of its defectiveness would be equivalent to arguing that since the US lost the Vietnam war, then its army must have been weak...

Elton's main thesis is that the crisis of the Empire was not a military one, ie the army did not have structural faults that "explain" the fall of the empire. His arguments are always stimulating and supported by research work which is often startling. The bibliography at the end of the book provides useful references to works of historians with different opinions. You might especially want to compare Elton's work with Arther Ferrill's "The fall of the Roman Empire", which takes a totally opposite view.