Product Description

The end of the Cold War makes it possible, for the first time, to begin writing its history from a truly international perspective, one reflecting Soviet, East European, and Chinese as well as American and West European viewpoints. In a major departure from his earlier scholarship, John Lewis Gaddis, the pre-eminent American authority on the United States and the Cold War, has written a comprehensive comparative history of that conflict from its origins through to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban missile crisis. We Now Know is packed with new information drawn from previously unavailable sources; it also reflects the findings of a new generation of Cold War historians. It contains striking new insights into the role of ideology, democracy, economics, alliances, and nuclear weapons, as well as major reinterpretations of Stalin, Truman, Khrushchev, Mao, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. It suggests solutions to long-standing puzzles: Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why was Germany divided? Who started the Korean War? What did the Americans mean by "massive retaliation"? When did the Sino-Soviet split begin? Why did the U.S.S.R. send missiles to Cuba? And what made the Cold War last as long as it did? This is a fresh, thought-provoking and powerfully argued reassessment of the Cold War by one of its most distinguished historians. It will set the agenda for debates on this subject for years to come.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #120157 in Books
• Published on: 1998-03-12
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 448 pages

The Economist Review 15/03/97
"a masterly review of the early phases of the conflict between the United States, Russia, China and their respective allies...it is clear, thorough and judicious; in short, magnificent."

Review
'A masterly review of the early phases of the conflict between the United States, Russia, China and their respective allies...it is clear, thorough and judicious; in short, magnificent.' (The Economist Review )

'A new narrative of the first half of the Cold War up to the Cuban missile crisis...We Know Now is an important book. It deserves a wide readership.' (Taylor Downing, The Observer )

John Dumbrell/American Studies
Gaddis' accomplishments as a Cold War historian need little in the way of advertisement. He writes provocatively and brilliantly...These accounts, taking the story of the Cold War up to 1963, are intrinsically valuable and provide welcome short-cuts to the student./John Dumbrell/American Studies 32/1.

Customer Reviews

Interesting but not groundbreaking
Gaddis' recent work on the Cold War has been somewhat hampered for many of the same reasons as most other Realists since the end of the Cold War. "We Now Know" makes big boasts that it doesn't entirely fulfil, but makes a cogent argument for laying the blame at the door of authoritarianism.

Fluidly written and deceptively deep post-revisionism is the order of the day, and there are few contemporary authors to rival Gaddis for sheer persuasiveness.

Incisive, compelling arguments.
No, this book doesn't come too soon after the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis says at appropriate points, "we now know," suggesting we know much more and can evaluate much better than we could even at the end of the Cold War, but the "now" is just a temproary point. Obviously, we will eventually know more, perhaps much more. But, for now, Gaddis sheds new light on numerous events, and he does so in a serious but almost self-deprecating manner. For someone just plunging into the Cold War, this would be an excellent place to start. For those who lived through most of the Cold War as I did, and have studied it now and again, this work provides a wonderful reality check.

Right-Winger Gaddis Does Not Have All The Answers.
In the 1970s and '80s John Lewis Gaddis established a distinguished reputation as the leader of the post-revisionist school on the origins of the Cold War. Since then, sadly, his writing has been characterised by a drift towards the misguided stance of the Reaganite Right. In his latest work he has made a commendable early attempt to analyise the substantive new reaources made avaliable by the declassification of the Soviet archives. Yet his title "We Now Know" (a notion repeatedly asserted throughout this work) claims far too much. The new evidence has contributed to the debate on the Cold War but does not provide all the answers - indeed, how could they have done? A radically different set of conclusions could be drawn from the archival evidence than those that Gaddis's deeply conservative perspective leads him to. This is a useful contribution to the debate on the Cold War, therefore, but nobody should be deluded into thinking this is a definitive work. "We Now Know More" would have been a more accurate - if less catchy - title. We cannot expect all the arguments concerning the Cold War to be resolved at a stroke. The debate has a long way to run yet.