Product Description

This is the first serious analysis of the combat capability of the British army in the Second World War. It sweeps away the myth that the army suffered from poor morale, and that it only won its battles through the use of 'brute force' and by reverting to the techniques of the First World War. David French analyses the place of the army in British interwar strategy and during the Second World War. He shows that after 1918 the General Staff tried hard to learn the lessons of the First World War, enthusiastically embracing technology as the best way of minimizing future casualties. In the first half of the Second World War the army did suffer from manifold weaknesses, not just in the form of shortages of equipment, but also in the way in which it applied its doctrine. Few soldiers were actively eager to close with the enemy, but the morale of the army never collapsed and its combat capability steadily improved from 1942 onwards. Professor French assesses Montgomery's contributions to the war effort and concludes the most important were his willingness to impose a uniform understanding of doctrine on his subordinates, and to use mechanized firepower in ways quite different from Haig in the First World War.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #311174 in Books
• Published on: 2001-07-05
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 336 pages

I.M. Roth, CHOICE, Jan 2001.
"masterful and fascinating book ... not just a military history but a carefully woven account of the political, economic, social, and personal elements that illustrate the way that an army is equipped and led, and how and why it fights."

Review
arresting new study ... a bold book - the boldness of its conception too easily taken for granted - as stimulating and discriminating as anything in the field since the iconoclastic Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945 (1982) by Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham ... His work is a comprehensive exercise in ground-clearing, and a searching assessment of each element of fighting power ... It is a noble calling, and it makes a convincing book. (Alex Danchev, Times Literary Supplement )

French succeeds admirably in modifying the judgement of those who have contrasted the British army's performance unfavourably with that of the Germans. As he remarks, 'the British had never believed that they could win their battles by pitting man against man, and indeed they never believed that they should even try to do so'. In the end, it was better to be soldiers than warriors.' (Reviews in History )

masterful and fascinating book ... not just a military history but a carefully woven account of the political, economic, social, and personal elements that illustrate the way that an army is equipped and led, and how and why it fights. (I.M. Roth, CHOICE, Jan 2001. )

French's study is based on an exhaustive examination of previously unused primary material, and as such it will stand as the definitive work on the structure of the British Army between 1919 and 1945 ... it will win a devoted following from specialists in the history of World War II. (John P. Rossi, History, Summer 2000. )

David French's book makes compelling reading for any serious student of the Second World War ... this book makes a key contribution to the debate about how the British fought the Second World War, and why the Allies took so long to win it. (Evening Standard )

Evening Standard
"David French's book makes compelling reading for any serious student of the Second World War ... this book makes a key contribution to the debate about how the British fought the Second World War, and why the Allies took so long to win it."

Customer Reviews

Clear sighted account of Britain's army in WW2
David French presents a very clear and sensible account of why Britain's army developed as it did. He opens with a review of how the army was seen after the war, the boosterism that was replaced by revisionism and discusses especially well the German assessments of British performance (and some were pro, even if the most quoted were con).

He describes how from much the same experience the British and German armies went in different directions. I found especially useful the section on national perceptions. The British who favoured individuality avoided the harsher training and command structures of the Germans, but were consequently left issuing detailed orders while the more rigidly trained Germans could operate more freely because of this training.

French reviews the shortcomings of British tank design and of the opposing German vehicles. His work on artillery is very informative - one gets the impression that the Germans (Achillies-like) felt the artillery (so like Paris) was an ungentlemanly (or just unmanly) way to win wars. French clearly feels that its massed use was a sensible response to the tactical problem. Considering Alan Brooke was a gunner it was surely to be expected.

A judicious history.

The story of the British WWII 'New Model Army'.
This book details the story of the development of the British Army from the end of WWI through until the close of WWII. It illustrates a failure to match interwar doctrine to training procedures and equipment. It shows the frustrating early failures of the army to try to carry out this doctrine and it's steady realisation that the Germans were better at it. With this realisation it changes the rules that it is prepared to play by and is then almost universally succesful.

A well balanced account
This is an exemplary account of the army in WW2. I'm puzzled that one reviewer should find it confirming his view of the British army's 'inferiority' to the Wehrmacht. My understanding was that it learned to play from its strengths and minimise the effects of its weaknesses (as all successful armies must do). Using artillery, the RAF and set piece battles did this. It's not somehow a failure if you don't fight the battle your adversries want you to fight; rather the reverse, I would have thought. And it led to victory - the best evidence of success there is.