Product Description

Volume III of The Oxford History of the British Empire covers the long nineteenth century, from the achievement of American independence in the 1780s to the eve of world war in 1914. This was the period of Britain's greatest expansion as both empire-builder and dominant world power. The volume is divided into two parts. The first contains thematic chapters, some focusing on Britain, others on areas at the imperial periphery, exploring those fundamental dynamics of British expansion which made imperial influence and rule possible. They also examine the economic, cultural, and institutional frameworks which gave shape to Britain's overseas empire. Part 2 is devoted to the principal areas of imperial activity overseas, including both white settler and tropical colonies. Chapters examine how British interests and imperial rule shaped individual regions' nineteenth-century political and social-economic history. Themes dealt with include the economics of empire, imperial institutions, defence, technology, imperial and colonial cultures, science and exploration. Attention is given not only to the formal empire, from Australasia and the West Indies to India and the African colonies, but also to China and Latin America, often regarded as central components of a British `informal empire'. Series Blurb The Oxford History of the British Empire is a major new assessment of the Empire in the light of recent scholarship and the progressive opening of historical records. From the founding of colonies in North America and the West Indies in the seventeenth century to the reversion of Hong Kong to China at the end of the twentieth, British imperialism was a catalyst for far-reaching change. The Oxford History of the British Empire as a comprehensive study allows us to understand the end of Empire in relation to its beginnings, the meaning of British imperialism for the ruled as well as the rulers, and the significance of the British Empire as a theme in world history

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #249243 in Books
• Published on: 2001-07-26
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 800 pages

Bernard Porter, TLS
"this chapter [The Nineteenth Century] is infinitely more enlightening then anything to be found in the Cambridge Volumes."

Review
impressive ... the overall achievement is undeniably impressive. Under the magisterial guidance of Louis ... a vast array of historians has produced a solid monument of contemporary scholarship. (David Gilmour, FT Weekend 19/2/00 )

this chapter [The Nineteenth Century] is infinitely more enlightening then anything to be found in the Cambridge Volumes. (Bernard Porter, TLS )

These final three volumes should be compulsory reading for anyone with an interest in the subject (Bernard Porter, TLS )

Bernard Porter, TLS
"These final three volumes should be compulsory reading for anyone with an interest in the subject"

Customer Reviews

Biting off too much
Historians mostly now agree that the expansion of the Empire from 1815 to the Treaty of Versailles brought little economic net benefit to Britain, while the African Empire in particular resulted in a significant net loss to the exchequer. The Africans and Asians didn't want to be ruled by Britain, and colonisation disrupted native social systems to no obvious short-term benfit to the natives. So could successive British governments, if given sufficiently accurate crystal balls, have handled anything differently to everyone's advantage? This, the third volume in the series, helps to answer the question.

Consider the settler colonies first. It's not obvious that there was any gain to Britain (as opposed to individual colonists) in encouraging emigration. However, an influx of Europeans (or possibly Americans in the case of Canada) into Australia or central or western Canada was probably inevitable - the temptation to exploit the under-exploited land would simply have been too great. (But it is possible that New Zealand could have been left to the Maoris.)

Africa is more complicated. Farming settlement in, for example Kenya or Southern Rhodesia should probably have been discouraged, but this is only half the story. The big profits to be had out of Africa related to mineral extraction. In much of Africa there weren't functioning states with which the mining companies could negotiate. If British mining companies didn't go in, the French, Belgians and Germans would have been more than happy to fill the vacuum. The question is, how far should governments have gone to protect the investments? I would argue that the companies should have been left to their own devices. But I'm not totally sure - such a hands-off approach could easily have led to private mini-states in for instance the copper belt happily exploiting the natives, arming themselves and encouraging farmer-settlers to come in to help feed the miners. What is more certain is that where states did exist that weren't fully cooperative with the miners - Ashante, or the Boer republics spring to mind - they should have been left alone.

India, where a functioning and reasonably compliant state already existed, is different again. Britain's interest lay in ensuring the continuation of a centralised state that was open to free-trade (or even better, free trade with Britain alone). But the Mughal empire was falling apart. I can't see a better option than that finally adopted - taking over the whole country. But with hindsight we can see that a native Indian administration should have been set up almost immediately rather than drafting in a white Indian civil service. And Burma was an unnecessary addition.

With an Indian empire in place then obviously Britain would have been interested in Suez, but the protectorate in Egypt, and the line of acquisitions from Sudan to Oman made to protect the shipping routes weren't necessary, as events proved, while the Middle East mandates were a disaster.

Conversely, there were a few tasty bits of real estate that maybe could have been usefully snaffled up: Panama maybe, or Formosa. Generally however the system of "informal empire" that developed where Britain was unable to establish domination, in fact made a lot more sense. It functioned pretty well in Latin America and Persia and was at least profitable in China.

And finally Ireland. The government's response to the Famine was clearly pathetic, and equally clearly led to the bitter relationship with the huge Irish community that grew up in America. And opportunities were missed to bring in Home Rule (for a united Ireland!) when the House of Lords was permitted to keep blocking the bills that Gladstone got through the Commons.

So we can envisage a different empire by the end of the First World War, massively slimmed down in Africa (Suez, the Cape, a few trading posts/coaling stations and maybe the Niger delta), and conceivably reconciled to self-rule under the crown in India and Ireland. An Empire better able to withstand the stresses of the Second World War and America's rise to dominance. But more about that when I review the next volume.

Excellent academic survey of nineteenth-century imperialism
Like its other four counterparts, this book provides a masterly overview of the British empire in the nineteenth century. The contributors are also a veritable Whos Who of renowned historians working on the British empire from across the world. It covers both geographic scope and also themes of imperialism with excellent chapters on missionaries, trade, migration, science, defence. Perhaps the only missing component was any serious discussion of race (also missing from the other books in the series) and which is surely central to our understanding of nineteenth century imperialism.