Causing Actions
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Product Description
Thoughts often cause deeds. Actions are done for reasons. But do actions and their mental causes also have descriptions that do not involve reasons? Various considerations can make it seem that human mental events must be biochemical events. Paul Pietroski, however, defends a non-Cartesian form of dualism. Actions and their rationalizing causes belong to an autonomous mental domain-although this autonomy is compatible with the supervenience of the mental on the non-mental. On this view, some bodily motions have rationalizing causes distinct from any biochemical causes; Pietroski argues that this is not an objectionable form of overdetermination. Central to his account is his proposed treatment of ceteris paribus laws, their role in explanation, and how such laws are related to singular causal claims. Pietroski also connects these issues to semantic questions arising from discussions of action reports and belief ascriptions. All philosophers interested in mind or causation will be intrigued by his new theory.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #2762624 in Books
- Published on: 2002-06-06
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 288 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
The book combines argumentative acuity with thoughtfulness about philosophy's projects. And it is recommended reading not only for those who worry about mental causation and want to see a carefully crafted account of its operation, but for anyone interested in any of the variety of topics covered MIND Every one of the chapters of Causing Actions is full of careful argument. And Pietroski's treatments of his various topics always have an interest in their own right, independently of their role in the whole MIND
MIND
"Every one of the chapters of Causing Actions is full of careful argument. And Pietroski's treatments of his various topics always have an interest in their own right, independently of their role in the whole"
About the Author
Paul M. Pietroski is Associate Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy at the University of Maryland. He was previously Associate Professor at McGill University.
