Product Description

In Neuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, Neuroscience and Philosophy is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #41512 in Books
• Published on: 2009-04-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 232 pages

Review
"A useful introduction." -- Barry Dainton, Science "Readable and accessible." -- James Sage, Metapsychology "A good introduction to this dynamic subfield." -- Library Journal "[A] rare opportunity to appreciate an encapsulated philosophical debate... Recommended." -- CHOICE

About the Author
Maxwell Bennett is professor of neuroscience and university chair at the University of Sydney and scientific director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute. His most recent books are History of the Synapse, The Idea of Consciousness, and Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which he coauthored with Peter Hacker.Daniel Dennett is Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. He is the author of numerous books including Freedom Evolves, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.Peter Hacker is a fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. The leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein, his seventeen books include, most recently, Human Nature: The Categorical Framework, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which he coauthored with Maxwell Bennett, and Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies.John Searle is Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of sixteen books, including Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, and Mind: A Brief Introduction. His works have been translated into twenty-one languages, and in 2004 he was awarded the National Humanities Medal.

Customer Reviews

Proper excitement over mind-body language
This brilliant book contains selections from 'Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience' of Maxwell Bennett (neuroscientist) / Peter Hacker (Wittgenstein specialist) and a 'triangle' discussion between these authors and Daniel Dennett and John Searle.
It is common in science to use intentional and phenomenal terms ('thinking', 'feeling', 'deciding') not only for people, but also for parts of people (especially brains and brain parts). According to 'Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience' this is not - as it seems - a matter of handy metaphor, but it reveals a misunderstanding and in the end incoherence of the language used. Talk about human beings and talk about biology are mixed in a way that adds smoke, to say the least.
Searle (as usual, imho) misses the point and keeps repeating that, for example, the foot as we feel it (part of the 'phenomenal body') is 'in our head'. It is just this sort of embarrassing silliness that Bennett and Hacker expose. In this way Searle does not really add to the discussion, but nevertheless he provides a clear illustration of the misunderstanding at stake.
The reaction of Dennett (beautifully written, but maybe a bit too sharp and personally hurt) is much more important. The differences between Bennett/Hacker and Dennett reveal an interesting tension: in what way can or must we stretch the common use of words like 'think', 'interpret', etc. that they provide more insight and not less?
Yes, Bennett and Hacker are right to warn us that you cannot jump to conclusions by using words in inconsistent ways (with clashing criteria or 'rules'). Don't confuse metaphor with explanation. Projecting human properties on body parts can actually hinder our understanding of the way brains work.
Dennett is right that stretching words is an inspiring way to try to make sense of the growing information we have on brain mechanisms. And he makes a point that his vision of sub-agents ('homunculi' with less functionality than the whole, and with appropriately and gradually less reason to be viewed with an 'intentional stance') does give a fascinating model for future research.
This subject can be seen as: how strictly (and how rigidly) Wittgensteinian should we want to be?
There's much to be said for both parties and this discussion alone already contributes to what Bennett and Hacker clearly had in mind: to sharpen our awareness of the words we use and to put full light on the boundaries between profit and distraction, between adding sense and getting under the spell of our own metaphors.