Product Description

The carnage on the Western Front at Passchendaele, where 275,000 Allied and 200,000 German soldiers fell, was neither inevitable nor inescapable, the authors of this volume insist. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson offer a complete account of the campaign, establishing what actually occurred, what options were available, and who was responsible for the devastation. This edition includes corrections and a new preface indicating the results of research completed since first publication.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #162122 in Books
• Published on: 2002-05-08
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 272 pages

Review
"The clearest and most balanced picture yet of a battle whose very name evokes the horror and supposed futility of World War I." John Grigg, The Spectator "This book will appeal to both the scholar and the general public and belongs in every World War I collection." Agnes F. Peterson, History "An excellent, carefully researched, and dispassionate history of the Passchendaele campaign... It must now become the standard scholarly work on the grim battle of Passchendaele, integrating as it does both politics and war." Tim Travers, Journal of Military History "The most wide-ranging and perceptive account of Passchendaele yet written" Robert Cowley, Military History Quarterly "The authors excell in their thorough use of original sources to provide a masterly account... clearly related and supported by admirable maps." Brian Bond, Times Literary Supplement "Lucid and persuasive." E.S. Turner, London Review of Books "An extraordinary investigation of Sir Douglas Haig's ruinous Third Ypres campaign of 1917... This is the most wide-ranging and perceptive account of Passchendaele yet written. This book not only captures the agony of the soldiers' war but, in the measured, understated tone of the best prosecutors, leads us to inevitable conclusions." Robert Cowley, Military History Quarterly "A monument to scholarship, economical and often eloquent writing, and a solid grasp of the real issues involved in World War I.... This is a great book... It is a book that every marine who aspires to higher command should add to his or her library - one that will undoubtedly reward its owner by rereading and rereading." Williamson Murray, Marine Corps Gazette "Without a doubt the best book on the campaign yet published... It is well-researched, well-written, and will keep historians arguing for years to come." Stand To "Prior and Wilson, both distinguished historians, have conducted extensive primary research to provide an account at once both provocative and authoritative" Choice "The authors should be commended for writing a balanced, convincing work that reveals the devastation of the First World War and the failure of military and political leaders to recognise this horror." Virginia Quarterly Review

Agnes F. Peterson, History
"This book will appeal to both the scholar and the general public and belongs in every World War I collection."

Tim Travers, Journal of Military History
"An excellent, carefully researched, and dispassionate history of the Passchendaele campaign ... It must now become the standard scholarly work on the grim battle of Passchendaele, integrating as it does both politics and war."

Customer Reviews

An informative but depressing read
This is not the first book on this subject and likely not the last but it is entirely worth your obtaining now because it includes information that was probably not available for earlier treatments. The antipodeans which wrote this tome are well suited to the task due to the enormous and often unconsidered contribution their countrymen and others from the Empire made to the battles here.

I was left with a mixture of feelings as I turned the last page. The most overwhelming is the sense of inevitability about the whole tragic course of events. You are impressed by the bravery and the skill of the participants in the face of terrific odds. Yet if only this had been matched or even approached by those who planned these actions.

This was not as some might have said a futile waste of soldiers but rather almost the only way the war could be continued. Empire soldiers were 'foreigners' in Flanders fields and yet they gave their lives without question when ordered to advance. It shames so many of the French and other troops who could not find it in themselves to be spurred on by this sacrifice.

Timing is everything in war as in any other large-scale activity. Here inevitability takes a cruel turn at Ypres. Maybe it would have been better to have dug in until 1918. The Russians had struck their deal with the Germans and it would be months before the Americans could contribute effectively. Perhaps if the British had defended rather than attacked the losses would have been less horrifying (even though many thousands were lost every week in the trenches during periods between attacks). These men were, however, in good form with better training, tactics and equipment than ever before.

It strikes me that better than at any time in the Great War, the men were ready and would give good account of themselves. What they needed, however, was a solid plan and commitment from their military and political overseers. I nearly said 'superiors' or 'leaders'. The likes of PM Lloyd George, General Haig and their appointed junior generals were neither. So tactically some major successes were achieved which make for heartwarming reading so as to leaven the losses. But strategically it was always going to be a disaster. Haig had some ideas about relieving Belgium but his ambitions would demand resources not available until D-Day of WW2.

No, it becomes clear that the Empire had promised to fight the Germans and fight it did. It could not choose the ground because it had to be in their sector. This reduced the options and in large part it was going to be inevitable that it would be in area that became the lethal mire that is 'Passchendaele'. Bad luck dogged them when unseasonably high levels of rain persisted. That and the shellfire which played such a decisive role in tactical success - one of the clear messages of this book - literally bogged down the attacks leaving the defenders able to beat them off.

I was left with the thought that those that drew up the plans for this offensive should have been forced to join the rank and file. But even that would not have been punishment to match their crimes. I could not believe it that the hard-fought ground they had captured was it turned out un-defendable:
'What had taken four months to win was evacuated in three days'.

That must be the epitaph for Passchendaele. If only they had thought far enough ahead. I cannot believe that those in charge of planning such offensives would not have better appraised their objectives, the geography and the weather. Never mind the deserters, such men should have been shot for neglect.

So, a great book and essential for any student of the Great War. One little niggle for me was the understated treatment of the contribution of the Royal Flying Corps. The fulcrum of any success was delivery of explosive to neutralise the enemy defences. The emphasis here is on the artillery with scant mention of the RFC as anything other than scouts with no assessment of any bombing which could have provided at least some support to troops whose advance had out-distanced the supporting gunfire. The recipe that was to become 'Blitzkrieg' in WW2 is all here - the only thing missing was the aviation component. Oh, and radios, of course!