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Britain and the Origins of the First World War (Making of the Twentieth Century)
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Product Description
Taking into account scholarship since 1980, this new edition rejects recent arguments that Britain went to war out of either weakness, fear of an "invented" German menace or fears for the Empire. Instead, while placing greater emphasis than before on the role of Russia, Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson maintain the view that Britain was forced into the war in order to preserve the European balance of power and Britain's favourable position within it.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #486001 in Books
- Published on: 2003-04-25
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 352 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
"Here at last we have that balanced, learned account which will make it easily the best guide to this complicated and important topic. The structure and layout of the book are admirable; the style is clear and flowing; and the erudition and clarity of argument convincing." --Paul Kennedy, "The Sunday Times"
"Zara Steiner has the control of sources and the mastery of detail that are taken for granted in Cambridge dons." --"The Economist"
Zara Steiner's book is a sober, sensible account of how this country became impelled into the First World War. She is a very good historian, with exceptionally balanced judgement. --C.P. Snow, "Financial Times"
[Steiner's] brilliant exposition provides many ideas to argue over and some to agree with. --A.J.P. Taylor, "The Observer"
About the Author
ZARA S. STEINER is Emeritus Fellow of New Hall, University of Cambridge. - KEITH NEILSON is Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada.
Customer Reviews
Did Britain Cause the First World War?
The answer to this question is no; BUT Britain could have taken actions which might have put the breaks on.
Foreign policy in the run up to the July crisis was firmly in the hands of Sir Edward Grey who, it seems, could not decide on the key question of whether or not to enter a full military alliance with France.
The deterent effect of such an alliance might - just might - have made Berlin think more carefully before launching the pre-emptive attack on France.
Without doubt this book is of central interest to anyone wishing to understand the outbreak of World War I.
