Product Description

This is the first study in English to chart France's relations with the rest of the world over the whole of the twentieth century. Those relations are characterized by remarkable degrees of continuity in terms of how France perceives herself, how she perceives others and how she believes the two should interact. In short, France's relations with the rest of the world are an example of a tremendous over-investment in grandeur. Yet throughout the twentieth century France showed remarkable resilience in maintaining her great power status in the face of repeated setbacks and defeats internally and externally. Despite her decline to a medium-sized power, like Britain, she has continued to `punch above her weight'.

This work not only analyses decision-making, strategic and defence issues, but also the work of the French intelligence agencies. It sets them against the 'deep forces' that have shaped France's international relations, from material aspects such as geography, demography and economics to more abstract features of France's national identity such as notions of the state, the civilising mission and ideas of grandeur.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #756478 in Books
• Published on: 2001-08-03
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 272 pages

H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and Social Sciences
Keiger's book is an engaging read.

Review
Keiger's book is an engaging read. (H-Net Reviews in the Humanities and Social Science )

About the Author

John F.V. Keiger is Professor of International History and Director of the European Studies Research Institute at the University of Salford, UK, and a fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

Customer Reviews

Interesting effort, but the analysis is often too thin
Readers will have high hopes of this book when they see the chapter headings promising separate analyses of France's relations with Germany, the "Anglo-Saxon" powers, Russia and the old French Empire. There are also separate chapters on diplomatic, military and intelligence matters. Unfortunately, the analysis is often rather thin, and much of the book seems to have been written in great haste. At one point the author even seems to think, extraordinarily, that Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany was the German foreign minister in the 1960s. The book is, however, much stronger on the pre-First World War period.