Product Description

The liberation of Europe and the destruction of the Third Reich is a story of courage and enduring triumph, of calamity and miscalculation. In this first volume of the Liberation Trilogy, Rick Atkinson shows why no modern reader can understand the ultimate victory of the Allied powers without a grasp of the great drama that unfolded in North Africa in 1942 and 1943. Beginning with the daring amphibious invasion in November 1942, An Army at Dawn follows the British and American armies as they fight the French in Morocco and Algeria, and then take on the Germans and Italians in Tunisia. Battle by battle, an inexperienced and sometimes poorly led army gradually becomes a superb fighting force. Central to the tale are the extraordinary but fallible commanders who come to dominate the battlefield: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Montgomery and Rommel.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #43162 in Books
• Published on: 2004-08-05
• Original language: English
• Binding: Paperback
• 704 pages

Review
'Every military history buff should read An Army at Dawn' Sunday Telegraph ' There is much to applaud in this impressively researched work ... An Army at Dawn makes utterly absorbing reading' BBC History ' More of a biography of a generation than of a class at West Point... Stark, shocking, jolting' John Eisenhower, Chicago Tribune

BBC History
'There is much to applaud in this impressively researched work . . . An Army at Dawn makes utterly absorbing reading'

Max Hastings, Sunday Telegraph
'Every military history buff should read An Army at Dawn'

Customer Reviews

Somewhat Hollywoodized History
This hefty volume tells the story of operation TORCH 1942-43 (the combined US-British landings in northwest Africa) in lots of interesting detail but is rather poorly contexted against the overall war in North Africa 1940-43, such that the US reader may be forgiven for thinking that TORCH and the 65,000 strong US army (along with 35,000 Brits) was essentially all there was to the Allied war there, instead of it being just one half of the end-game. For even during this book’s TORCH period, major events elsewhere, including the most decisive battle of the entire North Africa campaign, El Alamein (where Montgomery's combined British-Australian-New Zealand force of 200,000 eventually defeated a combined German-Italian one of 110,000), is not included! Atkinson only passingly mentions El Alamein in a couple of sentences! And even then he erroneously states that Montgomery outnumbered Rommel by 15 to 1, and blames Montgomery's lack of backbone to use this fictitious superiority to destroy the Axis army completely instead of allowing Rommel to recoup and beat the American army at Kesserine Pass.

And that unfortunately sets a tone seen elsewhere in the book - almost all the photos show Americans (one does show Montgomery, but with the caption that Eisenhower considered him "a son of a bitch"), and Atkinson blames a British plan and Royal Navy effort for the failed US assault on the Port of Oran, whilst forgetting that the entire decision to go there, and to trust the Vichy French defenders, was wholly an American insistence. Furthermore, Atkinson either glosses over Roosevelt's Anglophobia or pardons it as partly to do with the British "slaughter" of 1200 Vichy French sailors, whilst ignoring the context that the British had to destroy that fleet after it refused to join the free-French forces, so as to stop it being handed to the Germans to enable their taking control of the English Channel and an invasion of Britain in 1940-41. And the revolt of Roosevelt's entire (pro-British supporting) cabinet, when throughout ‘40-41 Roosevelt continually failed to follow up his words of support to Churchill with any actual actions, is mostly omitted. Instead, Atkinson emphasizes the Lend-Lease program whilst not mentioning that in reality this only constituted a mere 1% of the total British war effort.

To be fair, Atkinson is not uncritical of the American efforts. But overall, from his quiet rhetoric and slightly glossed-over version of US history, US readers will get a falsely warm and positive impression of how the US war effort might have begun very green but eventually won the war with only a little help from somewhat incompetent allies, whilst the rest of the World's readership will just see yet another example of the Hollywoodization of History in the vein of "Saving Private Ryan", and read no further. Which is a shame because, if you ignore Atkinson's occasional rhetoric, and realize that this is ONLY about operation TORCH and is NOT all the campaign or even the most decisive part of it, then you are still rewarded with a lot of interesting and highly detailed, minute-by-minute accounts of the actions and reasonable maps and so on (albeit sometimes interspersed with slightly too much American mushy sentimentality about sweethearts and parent's ice-cream parlors back home). So get your strategic and overall campaign-theater history elsewhere (always from several sources) and then use this book to enjoy Atkinson's in-depth depictions of specific operations and battles and a feel for the individual brave and unfortunate souls of many nations who fought and died there.

Partial yet honest
I bought this book expecting a full account of the entire WW2 North African campaign - but it is in fact an (addmiitedly hugely detailed) account of TORCH - the Western bit of the campaign, and so the 8th Army, Montgomery, El Alamein and all that stuff is totally missed, except when they combine with the (largely American) forces pushing eastwards under Eisenhower to Tunisia.

The detail of the many battles, for hills, villages and towns, is impressive, and it certainly gave me insight into a part of the war I had little knowledge about, but (and it is a big "but") it's strengths are then undermined by it's (almost) "American-only" perspective, and to a lesser extent by the relatively few detailed personal accounts it includes.

Whilst it may be harsh to criticize a book because it has a narrower focus that its cover is selling, the US-only aspect is harder to defend. Perpectives of German, Italian, French and a few more British combatants would have been welcome, and perhaps even a view of how the Arab natives - who appear only as cardboard cutouts, targets and cliches - found life as they were pitched ito a war-zone, and passed between as many as 3 occupying forces inside a couple of years. All in all I found myself wishing for a Max Hasings version to rectify these shortcomings (aka his excellent Armageddon on the fall of Germany).

So, what this book is is first and foremost an account of how the American army started to learn how to be come a combat outfit, and how some of its leaders got their first taste of action, and began their evolution into the war-winning commanders of Western Europe. It's good for that - and pulls no punches in criticizing the mistakes and shortcomings of men, strategy, organisation and logistics - but it still not even close to a 360 picture of the North African campaign.

Read for this, its a good and interesting read in itself - but don't believe the hype on the cover.

A Brilliant Synthesis
This book will be the definitive work, from the American point of view, on the war in North Africa, covering the period when the United States got involved (November 1942) up until the German surrender in Tunisia (May 1943). Mr. Atkinson effectively sets the stage by showing the sorry state the U.S. military had fallen into prior to the decision to invade North Africa. He points out that in September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, the U.S. Army had ranked seventeenth in the world in size and combat power, just behind Romania. When 136 German divisions conquered Western Europe in the Spring of 1940, the U.S. War Department reported that it could only field five divisions! Mr. Atkinson writes, "Equipment and weaponry were pathetic. Soldiers trained with drainpipes for antitank guns, stovepipes for mortar tubes, and brooms for rifles...Only six medium tanks had been built in 1939...This in part reflected an enduring loyalty to the horse..The Army's cavalry chief assured Congress in 1941 that four well-spaced horsemen could charge half a mile across an open field to destroy an enemy machine-gun nest without sustaining a scratch." This sort of information helps you to appreciate what had to be overcome in order for America to play its part in the expulsion of the Axis forces from North Africa. Mr. Atkinson doesn't fail to point out what other problems had to be overcome...Eisenhower having to learn "on the job" how to be Supreme Commander; having to build and then hold together the Allied coalition...this was very difficult, as many top men in the British military had nothing but disdain for Eisenhower's abilities and also for the abilities of the American troops (and many of the top American brass, such as Eisenhower, Bradley and Patton were Anglophobic, so it worked both ways!); the administrative and logistical nightmares...the actual amphibious landings, getting supplies to the troops, coordinating the actions of the British and American forces, etc.; plus the number one problem of building an effective fighting force, made up of officers who hadn't been in battle since WWI (and that was a type of battle that had little relevance in the current situation) and green troops that had never experienced combat. So, as Mr. Atkinson states, North Africa was the place where U.S. forces (and their superiors) learned to integrate and coordinate their actions both with themselves and with their Allies- and, on a more basic level, where they learned to hate and kill the enemy. North Africa prepared America for what had to be done later on in Italy and, of course, on and after June 6th, 1944. Mr. Atkinson is very evenhanded in his account. He doesn't hesitate to point out the mistakes made by both the British and the Americans. Eisenhower, Patton, Montgomery, Alexander, etc. all come in for their share of criticism as well as being praised, when praise is due. One thing that really surprised me was the sheer level of backbiting that went on...the nasty comments made by the British about the Americans, and vice-versa. The author is also very good at pointing out the numerous strategic and tactical errors made on the various battlefields. Mistakes were made by not only the top brass, but also by people in charge at lower levels. Very basic errors were made...such as not sending out reconnaisance units, initiating tank attacks without proper artillery or air support, etc. Many brave men were sent to their deaths in useless and ill-conceived actions. Sometimes just the sheer confusion of the battlefield was responsible, or just plain error...planes bombing their own men or artillery falling short, etc. Another area where Mr. Atkinson excels is in the "thumbnail" sketch of the numerous personalities that are integral to the story. The writing is sharp, witty and, quite often, eloquent. Here are just a few sentences concerning General Patton: "More than a quarter-century had gone by since his first intoxicating taste of battle and fame, during the Punitive Expedition to Mexico in 1916, when he had briefly become a national hero for killing three banditos and strapping their bodies to his automobile running boards like game trophies...At the age of fifty, upon reading J.F.C. Fuller's classic 'Generalship: It's Diseases and Their Cures', Patton had wept bitterly because eighty-nine of the one hundred great commanders were younger than he. Now, when he was fifty-six, his hour had come round." Mr. Atkinson is also very good at describing the nuts and bolts of the various battles. The descriptions are clear, vivid and exciting. A potential criticism of the book is that there is very little here concerning the view from the German and Italian side. However, I don't think such criticism would be warranted, as Mr. Atkinson's intent was never to show the war in North Africa from all points of view. He wanted to show the difficulties involved in the U.S. becoming an effective fighting force, the animosity that had to be overcome so that the Americans and the British could start to form an effective alliance and, lastly, to set the stage for volume II of his "Liberation Trilogy"- the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943. He has accomplished what he set out to do, and he has done so brilliantly.