Product Description

This book explores how British Army learnt from the pyrrhic victories of 1915-17 and developed the new tactics, leadership and doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate hitherto bedevilling Allied offensives to defeat the

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #771723 in Books
• Published on: 2004-12-21
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 272 pages

From the Back Cover
This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare and, in particular, examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparedness for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and materiel. British Generals, busy managing the army's expansion and inexperienced in continental war, were slow to reform. Tardiness in learning from mistakes and improving performance resulted not from the social background of senior officers, although resistance to change was a factor, but from the small size and inexperience of the military elite which had to learn how to run a continental war. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives in 1915-16 and an operational style of attack employing limited-objective set-pieces to overcome the German defences. These developments of 1916-18 provided the tactical and operational efficiency to defeat the formidable German Army and turn defeat into victory.

About the Author
Born in Walsall, Simon Robbins was brought up in Nigeria before returning to England for his education at Elmhurst, South Croydon and St Edward's School, Oxford. Reading History at Nottingham University, he gained an MA in War Studies and then undertook research on 'British Generalship on the Western Front, 1914-18' for a PhD at King's College London. He has worked in the Department of Documents at the Imperial War Museum since 1989. He also has a Diploma and an MA in Archive Studies from University College, London. He is the author of 'Staff Officer, the Diaries of Walter Guinness (First Lord Moyne), 1914-18' with Professor Brian Bond and 'God's General: Cromwell The Soldier'.

Customer Reviews

Scholarly and detailed, yet easy to read
There has been a huge amount of tosh written about the British generals of the First World War. Other than a ridiculous overemphasis by some on Douglas Haig and every detail of the mans character and behaviour, many authors have chosen to treat the rest of the hundreds of senior officers of the staffs and regiments as a faceless, uniform bunch who did little but send men to the slaughterhouse. This is clear nonsense. As in any walk of life there were men of differing abilities and ambitions; men who did or did not get on with each other; men who were visionary, men who were laggards. The war would not have been won as quickly as it was - or indeed at all - without the generals. No brave Tommy advancing with rifle and pack at Arras would have had the faintest idea of how to beat an entrenched, skilful and well armed enemy.

Simon Robbins' "British Generalship on the Western Front" dissects the beast, diagnoses the problem areas and shows how generals and generalship developed to create by 1918 an efficient, professional and highly advanced system of command. It is a masterly work in terms of citing its sources. Virtually every sentence contains a quote or a reference. But the core element is a statistical study of more than 700 officers: their background, school, class; their army training, regimental associations and career development; their battle performance, and so on. Simon brings alive the colourful mixture from Indian army "dugouts" dragged from years of comfortable retirement into the training of the New Armies right up to the battle experienced young men who were holding Brigade commands when the war was won. While the book is scholarly and detailed, it is remarkably easy to read.

One very serious gripe about this book is that it is fearsomely expensive. The copy I read came from the University of Birmingham main library. I enjoyed it and thought I would see if I could find a copy: wow. £65 and upwards for the hardback on the used market! £20 for a "print on demand paperback"! It's good - but it's not that good. Join your library and get it on interlibrary loan.