Product Description

This new volume explores the theory and practice of war and peace in modern historical context. 

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #259620 in Books
• Published on: 2007-04-20
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 320 pages

From the Back Cover

War, Peace and International Relations is an introduction to the strategic history of the past two centuries, years which were shaped and reshaped by wars. The book shows that war is not only about warfare – the military conduct of war – but is crucial to the political, social, and cultural behaviour of states.

Written by leading strategist Professor Colin Gray, this textbook provides students with a good grounding in the contribution of war to the development of the modern world, from the pre-industrial era to the post-industrial age of international terrorism and smart weapons.

War, Peace and International Relations:

• is the first one-volume strategic history textbook on the market
• covers all the major wars of the past two centuries
• is up to date and comprehensive, including chapters on irregular warfare and terrorism
• includes summary points, boxed sections, student questions and further reading.

Colin S. Gray is Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, UK. He is a professional strategic theorist and defence analyst, as well as a university professor of international relations. His 21 books include Modern Strategy (1999), and Another Bloody Century (2005).

About the Author
Colin S. Gray is professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Reading. He has published 20 books and innumerable journal articles.

Customer Reviews

Essential reading for students of global security
Colin Gray writes with great clarity on the complex but vitally important subject of the Strategic History of War, Peace and International Relations. I feel that this book follows on well from his earlier works Modern Strategy and Another Bloody Century , also with Rupert Smith's more recent work Utility of Force . It is a work of considerable scholarship and clearly designed for university students. However, I would also like to see the book being circulated and read by those in power and with influence in the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and other great offices of state, both at home and abroad. The lessons from past conflicts on understanding the critical difference between war and warfare, also between strategy and tactics must be learnt again and again to prevent needless loss of life and a failure to achieve the political purpose of war. This book is not specifically about military history, peace or diplomacy, but rather an analysis of the utility and the effective use of force to achieve strategic goals.
Of particular note is the authors' perceptive analysis of Carl Von Clausewitz's On War, which he covers in Chapter 2. I was particularly taken with his analysis:
"The distinctive perspective of this book, which is to say strategic history, focuses attention upon the consequences, or lack thereof, of military action. One might venture to dissent from Clausewitz with the belief that if Napoleon was the god of war, he seems to have lost the plot early in his career and confused war with warfare. Napoleon was so overfond of warfare the he forgot, if he ever knew, that warfare serves war, which must serve attainable policy goals. But for policy, war and warfare all to be singing off the same hymn sheet, there has to be a well-wrought and adaptable strategy."
How relevant that admonition would have been to our leaders before embarking on the invasion of Iraq! The author also suggests that the nature and dynamics of war, warfare and strategy have not changed over the course of the centuries. That is why the writings of Sun-tzu and Clausewitz remain relevant and essential for strategic education today. In particular that the strategist today is the same as in the past: "To employ force or the threat of force for political ends."
During his analysis of the First and Second World Wars, Gray suggests that the great wars of industrial mobilisation, cannot occur any more. They have been banished by two technological developments: nuclear weapons and information technology. He argues that there is at least one maxim of enduring merit:
"international order needs to be policed by someone or something... Disorder looms as a potent possibility. Today it is the menace posed by irregular warriors for an extreme variant of Islam, as well as by the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of those motivated to employ them. In the future it might be the rise of rivals to American hegemony...climate change...population distribution, energy, food and water resources that move ever more severely out of balance."
With regard to the threat of violent extremists he posits that Islamism can only be defeated by other Muslims. The issue is how to reconcile the modernisation of society with religious values.
In conclusion, Gray suggests "that humankind's strategic future is likely to resemble its past in important respects. The details will be different, but the grand narrative most probably will be painfully familiar!"
I would most strongly recommend this book to all students and practitioners of military strategy and the art and science of war.

Ivar Hellberg November 2007

an extraordinary book of strategic history
This book is an invaluable tool for anyone who is interested in knowing more about strategic history. It does not limit to deal with military history or the history of diplomacy. Rather, it takes a much broader view about the role of the use, and the threat of use, of force in international relations. The author's analysis skills are extraordinary. I recommend it to all the readers interested in those issues.