Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #424538 in Books
• Published on: 1991-04
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 448 pages

Customer Reviews

One off the great works on strategy in this century
Liddell Hart is perhaps one of the greatest military thinkers of this century. His early works were influential to the german generals, who invented the blitz-krieg doctrine prior to WW2. And his later works, first of all "Strategy" has been textbook material in military academies throughout the world since WW2.

In "Strategy, The indirect approach" Liddel Hart expands on Clausewitz theories, as they apply to 20th. century warfare. His basic theory is that the concentration of force against the weak points of the enemy is achieved by mobility - in every sense of the word. His basic premise is, that the enemy must ever be on the horns of dilemma - that is in doubt of your intentions. In Liddel Harts thinking, this concept includes: superior use of mobility, the use of multiple possible objectives to confuse the enemy and the ability to concentrate superior force if you do battle.

The sum of Liddell Hart's theories is a grand strategy, that places the emphasis on superior mobility (of troops and mind) and the ability to create confusion in the enemy - in other words Blitzkrieg. Furthermore he was one of the first to consider, how a domocratic government would influence military strategy.

In addition to this the book is a great read.

Messerheim's "Liddell Hart and the weight of history" is recomended as and informed and critical review of Liddell Harts work in general and his use of history to prove his points.

Ambitious work, but falls short
Liddell Hart, in Strategy, attempts to sell his readers what he believes to be the panacea to war fighting, the Indirect Approach. Hart also goes to great pains to dismiss the relevance of Clausewitz's On War. Like many British historians of his time, Hart reveals his seemingly reflexive distaste for anything Prussian or German. Although Hart provides a rich history of warfare from the time of the Peloponnesian War to World War II, he only supplies examples that support his thesis. Upon reading, I felt like Hart had a preconceived thesis, and then set out to prove it. However, true scholarship requires one to acknowledge contrary points of view, and deal with them. His criticism of Clausewitz is so unfounded as to make me question how deeply Hart actually read On War. Many of Hart's ideas are perfectly consistent with Clausewitz. Their main point of difference would be that Hart claims to have found the secret strategy that will always prove victorious, while Clausewitz painstakingly avoided writing a prescriptive work, emphasizing that each war is a unique situation, and the approach will then be unique. Hart is a good read, but ultimately falls short of his goal.

A masterpiece for strategy students
The importance of Liddell Hart as a strategic thinker is often forgotten. This book, which combines some of the first historical analysis of warfare and the sections on strategy as an area of study, is possibly the most important introduction to the area of strategic studies within international relations ever publisjhed. While not being an international political text, the impact on strategy can not be ignored. A worthwhile read, and a very useful text.