Product Description

In this fresh and challenging study of the origins of the Cold War, Professor Eisenberg traces the American role in dividing post-war Germany. Drawing upon many original documentary sources, she examines the Allied meeting on the Elbe, follows the Great Powers through their confrontation in Berlin, and culminates with the creation of the West German state in the fall of 1949. In contrast to many works in the field, the book argues that the partition of Germany was fundamentally an American decision. US policy-makers chose partition, mobilized reluctant West Europeans behind that approach, and, by excluding the Soviets from West Germany, contributed to the isolation of East Germany and the emergence of the post-World War II US-Soviet rivalry. The volume casts new light on the Berlin blockade, demonstrating that the United States rejected United Nations mediation and relied on its nuclear monopoly as the means of protecting its German agenda.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #629122 in Books
• Published on: 1998-03-28
• Released on: 2008-08-21
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 540 pages

Review
‘The work by Carolyn Eisenberg is an important contribution to the ‘revisionist history’ that mant claim has been discredited by the demise of the USSR … The analysis is very well documented, partly by means of archival material … serves as a valuable corrective to the triumphalist ‘post-revisionist’ historiography.’ NOD and Conversion

Customer Reviews

A book all Americans should read
This is a book all Americans should read, but probably won't. Although stylistically undistinguished, it tells a vitally important story about the origins of the cold war. Few criticisms of the Soviet Union's diplomacy are more damning than the way it imposed dictatorship in Eastern Europe. What Eisenberg's book suggests however, is that the partition of Germany was not the result of Stalinist bullying, but American preference for it over a neutral social democratic state. Relying on more than 70 sets of private papers and files, Eisenberg shows how the United States subtly weakened denazification, decarterlization and the American committment to ensure the war-ravaged Soviet Union its share of German reparations. Gradually they decided that economic recovery and political security required an American allied Germany even if the Soviet quarter remained a Communist dictatorship. As Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith bluntly put it "The difficulty under which we labor is that in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our requirements." With Truman having only a vague idea of the real issues, the United States ignored Soviet plans for reunification, forced plans for currency reform, and refused international proposals for mediation of the Berlin Blockade crisis. The consequences of this decision were incalcuably tragic for Central Europe and the world.