Product Description

Britain, as the most powerful of the European victors of World War One, had a unique responsibility to maintain the peace in the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles. The outbreak of a second, even more catastrophic war in 1939 has therefore always raised painful questions about Britain's failure to deal with Nazism. Could some other course of action have destroyed Hitler when he was still weak? In this highly disturbing new book, Ian Kershaw examines this crucial issue. He concentrates on the figure of Lord Londonderry grandee, patriot, cousin of Churchill and the government minister responsible for the RAF at a crucial point in its existence. Londonderry's reaction to the rise of Hitler - to pursue friendship with the Nazis at all costs - raises fundamental questions about Britain's role in the 1930s and whether in practice there was ever any possibility of preventing Hitler's leading Europe once again into war.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #173669 in Books
• Published on: 2004-10-07
• Format: Illustrated
• Original language: English
• Binding: Hardcover
• 488 pages

Amazon.co.uk
Author of Making Friends with Hitler, Ian Kershaw’s detailed account of British attitudes towards Nazi Germany and the ultimately futile attempts through appeasement to avoid military confrontation is a thought-provoking analysis of a chapter in history that many would prefer to forget. The central figure in the book, Lord Londonderry, cousin of Winston Churchill, was a member of one of Britain’s grandest and wealthiest aristocratic families, who held high and important office as Secretary of State for Air during the time of Hitler’s rise to power. The man was fabulously well-connected. The King called him ‘Charley’ and members of the Royal family were frequent guests at his London mansion. The political establishment sat regularly at his dinner table and he was on first-name terms with all the major political figures of the day. After being forced out of Government in 1935, Londonderry became a frequent visitor to Germany, met Hitler several times, stayed with Göring at his hunting lodge, and fraternized with Ribbentrop and other prominent Nazis. Instinctively pro-German, Londonderry had unalterable faith, at least until it was far too late, in the idea that war could best be averted by the gaining the friendship of Hitler’s Germany. The Nazi’s for their part conscientiously courted and exploited Londonderry’s good opinion and contacts until it became clear to them that he lacked real influence with policy-makers.

Kershaw’s book is the story of the rise and fall of Londonderry and, more generally, the story of Britain’s road to war. Londonderry was an incurable letter-writer who left a vast correspondence of over 10,000 letters, many of which directly related to Anglo-German relations, and this has enabled Kershaw to write an detailed account of this period in Britain’s history. The first part of the book looks at the range of misconceived and delusional attitudes to be found in Britain regarding Hitler’s intentions and character at the beginning of Nazi rule. We hear of Londonderry’s time as Air Minister in the context of British policies on armament and rearmament in the early 1930’s and his ultimate dismissal from government office in 1935. The heart of the book describes his well-intentioned but naïve career as the gentleman amateur diplomat intent on saving the world from a disastrous European war. Later chapters reveal Londonderry’s ultimate disillusionment with Hitler and the bitterly resentful later years of his life spent campaigning to vindicate his record as Air Minister and fruitlessly trying to shake off his acquired reputation as the most prominent Nazi sympathizer in Britain. In telling the Londonderry story Kershaw answers all the key questions about this period in Britain's history. How and why was it that so many people radically underestimated or misunderstood Hitler’s intentions? Could more have been done to stem the rise of Nazism and destroy Hitler when he was still weak? Was war with Germany avoidable or inevitable under the circumstances? What were the realistic policy options?

The only drawback is not with the book itself but rather with Londonderry the man. In short, it’s difficult to care about him, not because he was a Nazi sympathizer, which he was not, but because he appears as a tedious, rather pathetic figure evoking curiosity rather than admiration, contempt, or pity. In the end this is the story of a man unable to adjust easily to the requirements of democratic politics, duped by power politicians, and ultimately brought down by his own aristocratic values. Kershaw has produced another piece of first-class historical scholarship. Thanks to him, Londonderry may regain his place in history. But just not in the way he would have liked. --Larry Brown,/i>

New Statesman, 27th September, 2004
'a thorough and intelligent account of the complex twists and turns in British attitudes to Hitler's dictatorship'.

Literary Review, September 2004
'[an] intelligent, measured, nuanced, well-written and above all superbly objective account'

Customer Reviews

Lord Londonderry - Not someone to make friends with
Ian Kershaw's book on 'Lord Londonderry and Britain's Road to War' is an excellent piece on British politics towards Germany right up to 1939. Lord Londonderry is the two-way mirror through which Ian Kershaw tells this story.

Lord Londonderry is one these characters the world could happily do without. He is a rather well-connected aristocrat who makes a stab at playing politics without really understanding what he is up to. Indeed, he seemed to have a habit of being in opposition of British official policy. Whilst serving as Secretary of State for Air from 1931-35 he was strongly in favour of building up a powerful airforce (including bombers), which at that point flew right in the face of pacifism, which was then the predominant force in Britain. He did, however, set up the foundations for the Hurricanes and Spitfires, which became the backbone of British defence during the Battle of Britain. And that is perhaps Londonderry's only positive legacy.

Having been sacked from his job in 1935 he writes (in one of his letters) about being restless and feeling the need to do something outstanding. He subsequently plunges headlong into attempting to bring about an understanding between Germany and Britain in the course of which he establishes his life's legacy of being a super-appeaser towards Nazi Germany.

Whilst some Governments in Europe may have initially favoured Hitler's regime for bringing much needed political stability to Germany, by the mid-1930's it became increasingly clear that Hitler would follow a 'land-grabbing' strategy. The appeasement politics followed by successive British Governments up to 1939 arose out of the necessity of somehow containing Hitler, whilst hiding one's military weaknesses until after they had been resolved.

Running their own foreign policy, Lord Londonderry and others carried appeasement to extremes. The Nazis initially accepted Londonderry's overture quite readily, but they dropped him like a hot potato after they recognised that he was a non-entity in British politics. That didn't stop Londonderry who was convinced right up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia that cuddling the dictator would work. We all know what happened, but Londonderry never seemed to understand what was happening. Naivete at its best no doubt.

Could Londonderry have succeeded? Ian Kershaw asks that question in his book. And he gives the proper answer, too. And of course it is to the negative. Any containment policy or active engagement would eventually have led to Britain (and France) having to submit its policy to that of Nazi Germany. Besides, containment and engagement wouldn't have worked, because Hitler from 1933 onwards (if not since writing 'Mein Kampf') was determined to take over Europe, no matter what.
However undesirable war is, from 1936 onwards many a politician must have recognised that it would probably be the only means to rid the free world of the Nazis.

Ian Kershaw does an excellent analysis of this period of European history. He details all sides of the argument and he does a splendid job of it. Although this is an academic work, it is a fairly easy read. I also urge you to go through the footnotes, because they provide an important companion to the narrative.

Variations on a Londonderry Herr
There is no shortage of biographies of "larger than life" giants. Less abundant are the stories of history's lesser players who, when all is said and done, are smaller than life. The much hyphenated Charles Stewart Henry Vane-Tempest-Stewart, the seventh Marquess of Londonderry was one such smaller than life figure. Kershaw, in his "Making Friends With Hitler" has devoted an entire book to Lord Londonderry and has managed to set it out in an informative and entertaining fashion.

Londonderry was not intelligent, perceptive, politically astute, or charismatic. Winston Churchill, a cousin, referred to him as "that half-wit Charlie Londonderry." He was known in the press as the Londonderry Herr due to his pro-German, if not pro-Nazi, proclivities and for his well-known desire to become a private statesman and make friends with Hitler and his ilk in order to keep Britain out of war.

Kershaw uses Londonderry as a vehicle through which to re-examine Britain's relations with Germany from Hitler's accession to power through the commencement of WWII. The simple picture usually painted is one of the British political establishment conducting its ill-thought out policy of appeasement while Churchill stood alone crying in the wilderness. The situation was far more complex than that. Kershaw uses the antics of Lord Londonderry to set out Britain's foreign policy in the context of the day. Kershaw does not 'excuse' Britain's foreign policy makers for the steps that led invariably to war with Hitler. He does, however, provide a detailed description of the many reasons why, by 1936 or so, Britain had no viable option other than to appease Hitler and hope for the best.

Irresolvable conflicts of interest between France and Britain rendered a unified approach to an emerging Germany impossible. France's primary interest in the years after WWI was in its own security. The idea of making concessions from the admittedly ill-conceived Treaty of Versailles did not find fertile ground in France, particularly those that involved disarmament. Britain's goal was multilateral disarmament. Disarmament was almost universally supported in Britain by all political parties. Popular support for disarmament was fueled by revulsion towards the horrors and carnage of WWI. Political support for disarmament was fueled by a worldwide depression that made cutbacks in military spending both politically expedient and economically wise.

There was a strong feeling in Britain that German antipathy to the Versailles Treaty was understandable. British government suggestions with regard to revisions to Versailles were inextricably linked, however, to disarmament proposals. France opposed any such linkage and stalemates ensued. Hitler played this difference in national aspirations like a maestro. He managed to rearm, re-occupy the Rhineland, eviscerate the Versailles Treaty, and then annex Austria while France and England failed to craft a unified, coherent, response.

Londonderry played an interesting role in Britain's relations with Germany. A descendant of Lord Castlereagh, the architect of the settlement at the Congress of Vienna, Londonderry inherited incredible wealth. Londonderry believed that he was born to rule and lacked nothing but talent. His wealth and connections led to his appointment as secretary of state for air in 1931 by Ramsay MacDonald. Londonderry was a strong proponent of the air force and promoted the development of Hurricanes and Spitfire, the aircraft that later served Britain well in the Battle of Britain. He was pro-German and anti-French by inclination but believed that this friendship should be backed by a strong military. This was not an irrational position and if Londonderry had stuck to this position he legacy may have been considerably stronger.

However, he was an inept administrator and subject to embarrassing mistakes. During a period in which pacifism was a strong political force his speech supporting the use of bombers as a means of policing the Empire (including, ironically the British controlled oil-fields in Iraq) caused a great deal of embarrassment for the British government. Londonderry was sacked by Stanley Baldwin after he succeed MacDonald as Prime Minister. Devastated, Londonderry embarked on well-publicized private campaign to save Britain from the professionals in the foreign office. Critically, he forgot his earlier argument that military strength should form the underpinning of Britain's relationship with Germany, and assiduously sought out the friendship of the Nazi leadership. Even absent a strong military, Londonderry believed he could charm Hitler into good relations.

If the successive governments of MacDonald, Baldwin, and then Chamberlain can be thought of as proponents of appeasement, the forces of Londonderry and many of his well-born peers can be thought of as proponents of 'appeasement-plus'. In essence, MacDonald, Baldwin, and then Chamberlain took something of a middle road. It is clear from the source material used by Kershaw that at least from 1935 or 1936 the British government had few delusions about Hitler's intentions. However, they were constrained severely by their low level of military preparedness and a general unwillingness of the British population to take any steps to confront Hitler that might bring the parties to war.

Kershaw does an admirable job in exploring the social,political, and economic forces that helped shape appeasement. Kershaw points out that critical decisions concerning disarmament and the economic pressures that resulted in dramatic reductions in military spending up through 1936 or 1937 rendered a forceful response to Hitler (in the absence of concord with France) little more than a bluff. Kershaw also shows that the British government(s) was buffeted not only by Churchill but also by Londonderry and those fellow travelers.

Last, Kershaw's work is an academic piece of writing and is meticulously annotated and footnoted. However, the writing style is fluid and unpretentious. It can be enjoyed by a reader seeking a popular history as much as by someone with an academic interest.