Product Description

This is a comparative study of the fighting systems of the British and German armies in the Great War.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #1315045 in Books
• Published on: 1996-02-29
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 340 pages

From the Back Cover
This is a comparative study of the fighting systems of the British and German armies in the Great War. Taking issue with revisionist historians, Samuels argues that German success in battle can be explained by their superior tactical philosophy. The book offers an insight into the development of infantry tactics at a seminal point in the history of warfare.

Customer Reviews

Fabulous book on the British and German Armies in WWI
I'm amazed that this book has not received more attention. I came to it through a footnote in The Pity of War.

It is now a recognised fact that the German soldier was more effective man for man than the soldiers of any other army in the Great War. Samuels asks why.

I have read a lot of books about WWI and, in retrospect, it was impossible to understand the underlying causes for the lack of success of the British army's various offenses in 1915, 1916 and 1917 and the Germans success in the Spring of 1918 without reading this book.

It overturns just about every piece of conventional wisdom I have read on the British and German armies.

It opened up a whole new world in military history to me.

A rather unbalanced study...
Anyone wishing to learn about the processes of command, control and communications during the First World War will be hard pressed to find any modern, archive-based studies on the subject. Martin Samuuels' 'Command or Control?' is therefore, at the time of writing this review, one of the only books we can turn to for information. Unfortunately, there are a number of limitations with this study that need to be addressed. 'Command or Control?' has a very pro-German and anti-British feel about it. Taking 1 July 1916 and 21 March 1918 as the British case studies (the two worst days of the BEF's tenure on the Western Front) is far from a balanced and fair assessment of the BEF's performance during the war. Samuels fails to acknowledge the remaining three and a half months of the Somme campaign after 1 July 1916, where the BEF demonstrated a number of improvements, innovations and refinements in its methods. There is also no assessment of the last 100 days of the war in 1918, where the BEF reached tactical and operational maturity, to which the Germans simply had no answer to. Samuels is much better in his analysis of the German side of things, and this has to be the book's strength. But from a British perspective, 'Command or Control?' is rather lopsided, misleading and full of gaping holes.

Why the Germans nearly won
Martin Samuels's Command or Control?, compares British and German tactical development from the late 19th century through World War I. Its value is the clear distinctions it draws between the Second and Third Generationsof warfare, distinctions the reader will find useful when looking at the U.S. armed forces today. The British were so firmly attached to the Second Generation - at times, even the First - that German officers who had served on both fronts in World War I often said British troop handling was even worst than Russian. Bruce Gudmundsson argues that in each generation, one Brit is allowed really to understand the Germans. In our generation, Martin Samuels is that Brit. For more information on the four generations of warfare try www.d-n-i.net