Britain's Anti-submarine Capability, 1919-1939 (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History)
|
| List Price: | £95.00 |
| Price: | £90.25 & eligible for FREE Super Saver Delivery on orders over £5. Details |
Availability: Usually dispatched within 24 hours
Dispatched from and sold by Amazon.co.uk
Product Description
This book traces the evolution of all the various parts of Britain's anti-submarine capability and examines the development of the specialist anti-submarine and submarine-detector branches.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #1378169 in Books
- Published on: 2003-04-29
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Hardcover
- 200 pages
Editorial Reviews
From the Back Cover
Drawing extensively on primary resources, George Franklin traces the evolution of all the various parts of Britain's anti-submarine capability, including sensors, weapons, ships, aircraft and the organizations that procured, managed and operated the material. The book also examines the development of the specialist anti-submarine and submarine-detector branches. A detailed analysis of early wartime actions tests the system's effectiveness.
Through a close study of exercises, progress reports, staff papers and evolving tactical doctrine, the book challenges the view that the Royal Navy, suffering from over-confidence in newly developed sensors, neglected to study the anti-submarine problem in the inter-war years. It shows that a substantial amount of work was in fact undertaken, and that, in 1939, a cadre of expertise was in place to provide advice and guidance to senior officers, and that, when correctly employed, the available anti-submarine measures were highly effective. Futher, the work demonstrates that the specialist community was aware of the limitations of the asdic sensor and of the system in general. Specifically, it is shown that surfaced submarines were known to make poor asdic targets, that the danger of surfaced night attack was fully appreciated, and that such an attck was expected. A critical failure of the structure of the navel staff, however, meant that a number of senior and highly influential officers were not aware of the limitations, and this led to resources being wrongly employed in wartime.
About the Author
George D. Franklin is an engineering graduate of the University of Birmingham who also holds an MPhil in Modern History from the University of Glasgow. He has published a number of articles and book reviews on the history of the Royal Navy from 1919 to 1945. Since joining the Royal Navy as a seaman officer in 1993, he has served in a wide variety of ships, including three anti-submarine frigates.

