Product Description

This study is based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung and, to a lesser extent, by Jomini and Machiavelli. The central conclusion is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself. This third revised and expanded edition contains five new chapters. One of these concerns Clausewitz' insights into the problem of war termination. Another is dedicated to the importance of correctly identifying the nature of war. The author has also added a chapter on Corbett's naval strategy, the relation of his work to the spirit of that of Sun Tzu, and in particular the issue of limited war and war by limited contingency.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #93094 in Books
• Published on: 2000-09-29
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 512 pages

From the Back Cover

This is the first comprehensive study based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, and to a lesser extent, Jomini and Machiavelli. Brushing stereotypes aside, the author takes a fresh look at what these strategic thinkers actually said—not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background, and level of material/technological development, all had much more in common than previously supposed. In fact, the central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.

This third, revised and expanded edition includes five new chapters and some new charts and diagrams.

Customer Reviews

How Handel handles Classical Strategic Thought
Ideal for the academic is how I would describe Handel's 'Masters of War'. This however should not deter the keen reader from purchasing the book as it is indeed a wonderful, clear and interesting read.

In the course of his analysis, Handel sets out to compare and contrast the different schools of thought that 'the greats' developed, with particular attention being paid to Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. His analysis shows both thought and understanding of the cultural and historic influences on both tacticians. Perhaps this is where the text comes into its own for the academic.

If one was to consider writing a study on the conduct and role of the military in this day and age, this book brings not only Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz, but also Jomini and Machiavelli into focus. The student will hardly require a more comprehensive guide to different schools of thought for the construction of their essays. Another useful feature that Handel has adopted is the use of relevant questions pertaining to strategy as chapter starting points, thus improving both accessibility and clarity for the reader.

In conclusion therefore, I would reaffirm my belief that this text would prove invaluable for any classical military analyst attempting to find a text able to reduce the amount of time devoted to sifting through Sun Tzu's 'Art of War' and Von Clausewitz's 'On War'. However, taken out of this context, although highly readable, it is perhaps beyond the requirement of the casual reader whom might be better served reading abridged texts of the originals first.