Product Description

Although much has been written about the battle of Goose Green during the Falklands War, never before have its events been dissected so thoroughly and objectively, nor illuminated so clearly in the terms of current debate in NATO armies on tactical command systems as in this book. The British success at Goose Green was described by the then-Chief of the General Staff as "a feat of arms and gallantry probably unsurpassed in the glorious history of the British army"; how true a picture is given by such descriptions, both official and unofficial? Using factual analysis and in-depth interviews with participants, the author demonstrates that the battle in fact highlighted serious flaws in the British army's command culture. His knowledge of recent attempts to reform the army's command system, and of the ongoing tactics debate, allows Fitz-Gibbon to elucidate the two basic models of command system identifiable in the Falklands war. 'Restrictive control', traditionally preferred in the British army and still the accepted doctrine in 1982, holds that military action can be planned in detail in advance and expected to run according to plan as long as subordinates merely obey their orders. 'Directive command', on the contrary, recognises that the chaos of battle cannot be controlled without overwhelming material superiority, and therefore seeks to establish a more flexible system within the framework of an overall plan. Applying this distinction to Goose Green, Fitz-Gibbon shows that the British achieved much greater success when departing from the army's usual methodology - after the death of H Jones - than when adhering to the practices taught at officer training establishments. The worrying conclusion drawn from this assessment is that inaccurate reporting, and the unquestioning glorification of its performance, have hindered the army's efforts at modernising its command system, with serious consequences in past wars, and for future conflicts. This very readable book offers fascinating insights into how history is written and how armies often fail to learn from their experiences.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #413094 in Books
• Published on: 2001-07-18
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 208 pages

Review
"As a service to history, this is commendable" Major Ali Ahmed, USI Journal "His argument that Col. Jones leaned too heavily towards restrictive control is convincing ... a remarkably outspoken book." Soldier "Controversial and readable, explains clearly the two contradictory systems of tactical command under consideration at Goose Green. This is a fascinating book which looks at a very recent piece of our history from a new and disturbing angle." Forces News "Exhaustive research ... A masterly study of this confused action." Eastern Daily Press

About the Author
Spencer Fitz-Gibbon, has a PhD in Military Studies. He spent nine years in the Territorial Army including five years as an officer in 4th (Volunteer) Battalion The Parachute Regiment.

Customer Reviews

An in depth work examining the battle at many levels.
A Territorial Officer, Spencer Fitz-Gibbon has produced a book examining one of the most politcally sensitive battles of the Falklands Land conflict.Unlike most authors on the subject he has visited the battlefield and not relied purely on the witness statements and maps, which can result in incorrect conclusions being drawn. His research is extensive a comprehensive biblography and refence list is included. He features the written orders given by Lt Col 'H' Jones VC and a critique of his leadership style is made. The style can appear somewhat dry at times, but this is a factual subject and Fitz-Gibbon manages to steer well away from the pitfall of jingoism that many of the previous works fell prey to. Conclusions, contraversial at times, are drawn and some criticism of authors is included. But for overall feel, this book accurately portrays the misery and confusion that prevails (on both sides)of a battle. First published whilst the Army was modernising its doctrine, it is essential reading for soldiers and interesting reading for those who study military matters.

A fine history colored by conflict over military doctrine
For an American, it is difficult to imagine the importance of this battle or to understand the positive effect it had on the Thatcher government of the time; clearly it by all accounts in the media, the battle for Goose Green was a resounding success. Fitz-Gibbon, after almost two decades, has reexamined this battle and its immediate tactical consequences and placed his evaluation clearly within a current philosophical struggle of military doctrine. This struggle is between those military practitioners who believe that battles can be fought methodically, incrementally and mechanically through procedures, vice those who believe battles are chaotic affairs where procedures are used to apply military principles of war such as mobility, deception, tempo and psychology to un-hinge your adversary. Clearly Fitz-Gibbon falls into the latter camp. This book should be on the shelf of any military reformer

thourough study, but forgets the 'Toms'
I get the impression Goose green has ben a bee in Mr Fitz-Gibbon's bonnet for some time. He attacks the achievments of 2 PARA with fervour. Maybe this is to prove the armys command structure using restrictive controls does'nt work. However, at times, it all seems a little personal. It is however, a thorough study of the battle, although he seems to totally disregard the achievements of the junior NCO's and Private soldiers who fought there. Using airborne inititive and aggression, the battalion slogged on, against an entrenched enemy who had more ammunition and knew the ground. It is my belief, that a conventional infantry Battalion, without a selection like the Parachute regiment has, selecting people with the already mentioned inititive and controlled agression qualities, would have bogged down and would have withdrew. This is the real achievment of 2 PARA during the battle. I wish Mr FitZ-Gibbon could have been with me for 5 minutes in a wet , cold, depression in the ground as rounds cracked overhead, enemy artillery thumped in, to get the real taste of what battle is. Yes, thats right, i was there, with the Battalions patrol platoon. Not an armchair commentator!