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At Wellington's Right Hand

At Wellington's Right Hand
By Rory Muir

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Alexander Gordon was no ordinary soldier. In the Coruna campaign of 1808-9 he served as aide-de-camp to his uncle, Sir David Baird; then, in 1809, he joined Wellington's staff shortly before the battle of Talavera and remained at Wellington's side throughout the Peninsular War and in the Waterloo campaign. Both Baird and Wellington trusted him implicitly and he was perfectly placed to see how their plans developed. His long, confidential letters home to his brother, Lord Aberdeen, provide a unique insight into the British campaigns in the Peninsula. Written weekly or, at particularly interesting times, as a daily journal the letters record every twist and turn, every raised hope and false alarm of the campaigns and often explain the thinking which lay behind Wellington's operations more fully than in Wellington's own despatches. The letters represent an important source on the Peninsular War.


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  • Amazon Sales Rank: #1514815 in Books
  • Published on: 2003-08-09
  • Original language: English
  • Binding: Hardcover
  • 352 pages

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About the Author
Rory Muir is Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of History, University of Adelaide. He is the author of three books on the Napoleonic Wars. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815, Tactica and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon, and Salamanca, 1812.


Customer Reviews

At Wellington's Right Hand5
The book consists of letters written nearly 200 years ago by Alexander Gordon to his brother, the 4th Earl of Aberdeen. The letters cover the Peninsular War from 1808 when the French evacuated Portugal until March 1814 after Wellington defeated Soult at Orthez. In addition there is one written during the Waterloo campaign, where Gordon was mortally wounded at the age of 29.

The position occupied by the family in the political spectrum give us an insight of great value, as it helps to place the events described in a perspective that, albeit not historical, is certainly broader than it would have been otherwise. The letters focus on the events that take place and not, as is usual in memoirs of this kind, on personal reflections.

On Gordon's side, they describe what goes on in Wellington's HQ, the planning of the campaign, his opinions and feelings about people with whom he comes in contact, both British and French. There is nothing statesmanlike in his letters; on the contrary, they are often indiscreet, sometimes even naïve. Yet, he seems to have been genuinely valued by Wellington who often used him to parley with the French and kept him by his side for almost six years.

On Aberdeen's side, the domestic political situation, the impact of the War on people at home, the views in political circles are the features that give added interest to the correspondence.

The period of this correspondence includes Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and the creation of the alliance of the Great Powers against Napoleon. In effect, it covers events that were to shape Britain's power in the World for the next century.

The period of Aberdeen's Mission to Vienna is not covered in the letters from Alexander Gordon, there being a gap, but I believe the reference to the "interesting Events that you have seen" in the letter of 14 December 1813 may relate to it. Perhaps this gap was due to the difficulty of delivering mail across enemy territory, especially mail of a sensitive nature. Correspondence would have had to travel a complicated route running the risk of French interception and this would have caused great concern. I found this very intriguing and thought it interesting to look into the Intelligence questions raised by these letters.

Whilst interception of documents was not an infrequent occurrence, this was carried out usually by Spanish guerillas who harassed French troops and then passed the documents on to the Allies. From the Allies' point of view, there was clear access to the Atlantic ports. The Royal Navy, after Nelson, had control of the sea lanes to England; the risk of interception was therefore much smaller.

Very early on in the correspondence, whilst still ADC to his uncle, Gordon writes to his brother during the retreat from La Coruña in terms that makes one wonder at the extraordinary lack of security with regards to the information that these letters contain.

Lady Melville, with whom there was a familial relationship, is clearly alarmed when, in January 1809, she writes to Aberdeen:

"I return you Alex's Letters with thanks... He writes to you and to us in the plainest terms... I conceive to be in confidence & have treated accordingly upon all occasions, but ... if any of these letters unfortunately miscarried and fell into other Hands they are calculated in a moment of irritation like the present to do him material injury... especially those in which he speaks of the Intentions of his Superior Officers."

Aberdeen himself, on 17 November 1810, shows that he is alive to such possibilities and writes that: "This morning is the first time we have heard of you since the 13th of last month. Some dispatches must certainly have been lost between that time and the 3rd of this month."

A revealing paragraph turns up in Gordon's letter to Aberdeen dated 13 November 1811, a quiet period. "I must beg of you to be very careful to whom you show my letters, and opinions, as of late things have got about which we do not like; and which may do harm to the cause, and the more so as you must be aware that I frequently inform you of movements & plans before they are decidedly fixed upon, and which circumstances frequently obliges us to alter & perhaps altogether abandon".

It could be that the value of intelligence at that time was seen rather differently from what is the case today. Certainly intelligence "moved too slowly to bring real-time advantage and therefore Wellington's concern was to discover the lie of the land and the characteristics of the enemy". By all account, he was a great collector of maps and almanacs.

Our attitudes today are deeply influenced by the spy fiction of the Le Carré type that, for stylistic reasons, cannot acknowledge that "the ability to communicate quickly and securely is at the heart of real-time intelligence practice". Current preoccupation with Iraq is an indication of how deeply this spy fiction has come to be believed, notwithstanding the warnings from the professional assessors. The lesson of "Enigma", the obvious real-time gathering of intelligence in WWII should have been heeded. It did not win the War; at best it only shortened it.

At the time of the Peninsular War, Wellington would certainly be aware of the necessity for intercepting the enemy's communications (what is known today as "humint"), the absolute need for it to be fresh (that is, acquired in "real time"), believable, correctly interpreted, and effectively implemented. By definition, intelligence at that time moved too slowly to bring any great advantage. He may therefore not have been too concerned about this type of correspondence, preferring to rely on his knowledge of the topography and understanding of the enemy's character. Perhaps Messrs. Blair and Bush should have done the same.