Product Description

Military have assumed that the French lost the first battles of the First World War because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War. "The Battle of the Frontiers" is the first history of this battle and is based on groundbreaking research conducted at French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. "The Battle of the Frontiers" presents a dramatically new perspective on combat in 1914.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #118901 in Books
• Published on: 2009-12-01
• Binding: Paperback
• 336 pages

Customer Reviews

Biased tactical study
The so-called battle of the frontiers in 1914, during the opening days of the great war, has received astonishingly little attention. With the notable exception, that is, of the relatively minor actions in which the BEF (British expeditionary force) was involved: Mons and Le Cateau in particular. In reality, these "frontier battles" in august 1914 were a massive series of meeting engagements from Alsace in the southeast to Charleroi in the northwest. Most of them were catastrophic French defeats, all of them were bloody.

So hats off for Mr. Zuber for this new book, concentrating on the clashes in the Ardennes on or around August 22nd. These battles involved the French third and fourth armies and the German fourth and fifth. Mr. Zuber describes a series of fights in the wooded terrain of the Ardennes, with systematic and detailed descriptions primarily based on German sources. His main point is that the French didn't lose because of suicidal bayonet charges, but simply because the German army was much better trained, better led and applied sounder tactics and lower-level leadership. Which undoubtedly is true, up to a point. The problem is that he takes this very far. The author is undoubtedly very fascinated by the German army and all things German. This leads to a very strong pro-German bias throughout. One gets the impression of French soldiers milling around in their red trousers, doing absolutely nothing right, and even cowardly shooting Germans in the back. In the end, this glaring unbalance detracts from the reading experience.

True, the French were worsted in these battles, their casualties huge, Joffre's plan XVII failed. The defeat of the colonial Corps at Rossignol was a complete disaster. But still, I believe the facts are more nuanced. The French 5th army turned at Guise on the 29th and inflicted a sharp set-back on the German 2nd army. And some days later the whole French army astonishingly (yes, miraculously) turned, fought and stopped the Germans cold on the Marne. Had they suddenly become better trained?

The author is a retired officer, and his style is clear, dry and precise, with lots of abbreviations. There are maps, but a tactical study like this needs more and better. And the arranged cover photo, showing a proud German soldier with a dead "poilu" at his side, both in post-1916 uniforms, gives misleading associations and has nothing to do with 1914.