The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
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Average customer review:Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #171534 in Books
- Published on: 2006-03-31
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 336 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
Colonel Hammes has written an interesting and rather informative book about what he sees as the preeminent form of warfare in the 21st century...Hammes work provides thoguhful insights into the problems facing us today in Iraq - and perhaps tomorrow elsewhere. --Armour
Customer Reviews
A contribution to debate not an answer
This is quite an easy read for non-military people and ought to be on the reading list of politicians in particular. It undoubtedly does what it says on the tin by spelling out the developing nature of war into the 21st century.
It is probably not worth getting hung up on the definitions of the phases - they are just a useful structure. Nevertheless, the book provides a good summary of how fourth generation warfare (as defined) started with Mao before World War 2 and focuses on the direct destruction of the enemy's political will. It charts progress and refinements from Mao through Vietnam, the Sandanistas, the Palestinian Intifada and into Al-Qaeda, Iraq and Afghanistan and shows how insurgents form loose networks that are resilient and difficult to destroy.
It is made clear that 5GW has already started but worrying about that is to miss the point that modern "opponents" seek to win by wearing down political will through a long drawn-out struggle. They don't have to "win" - only stay in the struggle until the other (democratic) side gives-up and goes home. There are lessons here for policy makers and the military.
No book can cover all aspects but this is a useful contribution to the debate to be taken with other inputs. There is an extensive reference section, but no mention of Gunnar Heinsohn and his demographic theory of war (Sons of World Power etc., in German but still not in English) despite a clear lead into the subject on page 183 about "angry young men with time on their hands". A pity - it would be interesting to compare demographic profiles for the listed countries/campaigns and to suggest alternative policy responses as a result. Perhaps someone else can oblige?
Marketing Military Reform
Reading this I reminded of how twenty years ago Senator Gary Hart (remember him?) led the military reform movement in the US. In the diagnosis of the reformers the Pentagon and the US armed forces in general were overly bureaucratic, conservative wedded to hugely expensive and irrelevant weapons systems, outdated personnel policies and backward in their thinking about war. Their solution - a turn to the ideas of John Boyd and other proponents of manoeuvre warfare. However much the Pentagon bought into Boyd the characteristics of the organization remain the same.
Thomas Hammes is a recently retired US Marine Colonel his argument is that war has entered the fourth generation (4GW) and the US has failed to prepare for it even though it has already been defeated by 4GW opponents three times in Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia (this edition has a 2006 publication date but the text is unchanged from the 2004 initial publication) and is facing defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of learning how to deal with insurgent networks the Pentagon has invested in the high tech systems necessary to defeat a non-existent Warsaw Pact enemy.
Much of what Hammes has to say is sensible but trying to fit the whole story into four generations of warfare seems implausible. 1st generation is Napoleonic tactics, 2GW is First World War firepower based conflict, 3GW is blitzkrieg and 4GW is what comes after this. He argues that the transition is driven by changes in the broader social context of warfare. This doesn't work for me because the first of his case studies is Maoist People's War - if the level of development of the society drives innovation in warfare how can the China of the 1930s be more advanced...? I suspect that 4GW works more a marketing concept to sell his ideas in the military community.
My take on what Hammes sees as 4GW is essentially networked protracted war. Clausewitz realized that a stronger opponent could be defeated by protracted warfare provided that the weaker side could survive for long enough to build strength and/or transform the political situation. This insight lies at the heart of the Chinese/Vietnamese concept of protracted war. Hammes sees that in the contemporary world new civilian communications and transport systems provide new opportunities for the weak to challenge the strong while at the same time creating new vulnerabilities for their opponents.
If we look at the conflicts that the US has actually engaged in apart from Desert Storm and the March/April 2003 phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom Hammes is right. He seems on much weaker ground in putting forward ideas about how the US can actually prevail - can western democracies actually fight decades long wars in the current media environment? Here what he really needs is a more concrete analysis of current global politics.
Very good but not brilliant
I recently read this book (it reads easily, very well written) in a week or so for one of my essays at Uni. I found it very helpful in explaining HOW the current conflicts in the world are being fought. However, just as the previous reviewer has said, Hammes' emphasis on 4 generations of warfare, and categorising each one in black and white could well be just marketing a military reform. Also, by categorising warfare into 4 generations, it does seem a bit simplistic. Nevertheless what Hammes describes as 4GW (or whatever you want to call it) is very relevant to the wars/conflicts we see today.
All in all, a very good read.



