Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #217446 in Books
• Published on: 1993-10
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 272 pages

Synopsis
Offers a new picture of Hitler's conduct in World War II and a reinterpretation of the course of the war. Stolfi argues that but for one fateful decision by Hitler, which gave the defenders of Moscow time to regroup, Germany could have won the war in the summer of 1941.

Customer Reviews

Stolfi breaks new ground in E- Front historical analysis
Stolfi's analysis is both innovative and excellent. Like Holmes, he notices the clue of the "barking dog in the night." Watson says, "But there was no dog barking in the night." "Precisely," says Holmes.

Stolfi's thesis is that at the end of July the Soviets were on the ropes. There was nothing between the Germans and Moscow which could have stopped them. Everyone was champing at the bit to go for the jugular, i.e. Moscow. Take Moscow and the entire Eastern Front would be turned inside-out. The Red armies in the North and South would be on exterior lines, forced to fight on reversed fronts, without direct communications with each other. Continued Russian resistance no doubt depended on continued existence of the hated Communist regime, which was by that time very doubtful. With the Germans reported at Khimki, there were open incidents of rebellion in the streets.

To criticize Stolfi for repetition is to misunderstand the nature and obligations of logical argument and marshalling of evidence. He takes the case from each of several decisive perspectives and determines that no matter how you look at it, the Germans had the Russian campaign won at the end of July -- and with it, WW II. Defeating Russia, and thus obtaining the resources necessary to for the strategic forces buildup which Germany had not completed before 1939 (and these resources would have been secure from Allied bombing), Germany would have been able to turn West again, never fighting on more than one front (which was merely a variation on the classic German strategic theme that it must never fight a war on two fronts). America, preoccupied with the Japanese in the Pacific and faced with a fait accompli in Europe, might never have gotten involved in WW II in Europe anyway.

The only thing which saved Russia was Hitler and his characteristic penchant for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. His diversion of the attack away from Moscow for two months allowed the dissolving Russian defense to solidify. Even then, even with the mud and the early snow, the Wehrmacht still almost made it. But in the end, the German army's expertise couldn't counteract Hitler's interference again as they had been able to do in the campaign in France in 1940

What Stolfi points out is that the German military were not the simpletons they are often made out to be by the "they could never have defeated the combined industrial might of the Western democracies" crowd of critics. As he very astutely observes, if they won in the very beginning, as they had in France and Norway and the Balkans, then there would never have been a chance for that great might to be deployed. You can't play catch-up ball when the game is over without extra innings.

Stolfi's book is a brilliant exercise of military history, and is very interestedly supplemented by DiNardo's "Germany's Panzer Arm" and van Creveld's "Fighting Power." The German army was specifically designed to do the job it did in France and almost did (and only missed doing by a strategic hair's breadth) in Russia -- i.e. kick butt in the first few weeks and preempt the deployment of the superior strength of the opposition.

Once all is said and done, Stolfi's book is a stunning look at what almost happened to our world. Things would be profoundly different today in ways we can probably never imagine. In the end, his most compelling argument (which he approaches from the many important facets of the problem) is that they damned near did it just the way they said they were going to try to do it.

Simplistic and Repetitive
Stolfi's thesis is that Hitler lost the war when he failed to
launch an attack on Moscow in August 1941.

The author argues that (a) Hitler had the capability of attacking Moscow, and that conditions favoured
such an attack: first, the weather problems which Operation Typhoon met in November and December 1941
would not have been present, and (b) Hitler gave Stalin time to reinforce Moscow's defences.

There can be no argument about the weather, but Stalin only brought Zhukov's Far Eastern troops to the defence of
Moscow in reponse to Operation Typhoon, something he could equally have done in August or September.

Finally, Stolfi pays insufficient attention to the flank problems that might well have threatened an earlier
attack, and which are cited by other authors, such as Heinz Magenheimer in his book "Hitler's War".

I found the constant repetition of his central thesis, without additional support, less than convincing.

A very excellent Book
This book contains excellently researched supportive material. The eastern front of WWII has been described as one of the most extrodinary wars of all. Labelled 'The Great Patriotic War' by the Russians, much of the USSR statstics have been altered by that government. Mr.Stolfi takes another look at this great and terrible conflict. Statistically and realistically the author examines both The Wehrmact and Red Army's capabilities from the beginning of 'Barbarossa' to the end of 1941. Could Army Group Center of the German Army have marched on Moscow in August, 1941? What would have been the ramifications of this strategy? What are the misconceptions of this conflict? All of these questions are elaborated on in sufficient detail.