Product Description

A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines the Colossal Cracks operational technique employed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group. Rooted in concerns about morale and casualties, Colossal Cracks was a cautious, firepower-laden approach that involved the concentration of massive force at points of German weakness. Hart argues that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested and that Colossal Cracks represented the most appropriate weapon the British Army could develop under the circumstances.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #157197 in Books
• Published on: 2007-02-01
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 231 pages

Customer Reviews

The best assessment of Montgomery's 21st Army Gp
It is excellent to see this exceptional book published at a very reasonable price in paperback. The hardback cost has kept the analysis to too small a circle of experts. This book is not a narrative history of the role of 21st Army Group in North-West Europe but provides a convincing analytical account of the factors that both shaped the army and determined how it operated in action. Most importantly Stephen Hart demonstrates how the Army Group fitted within the large picture of the Allies joint and combined campaign to achieve success.

The truth - at last!
This is a book everyone interested in the Normandy campaign should read. I have only two regrets. Firstly, it has taken almost half a century for the truth to come out (the author even charts the progression from self-aggrandising or bilious accounts by the combatants to, as the 21st century dawned, more realistic and better researched accounts). My second gripe is the stilted prose of a Senior Lecturer at Sandhurst.

Having said that, Hart has mined the archives very well indeed and shed light on so many aspects which have been ignored. For example, far too much has been made of Montgomery's personal foibles, to the detriment of the constraints and imperatives which he - and his two army commanders - Dempsey and Crerar - had to work within. Among them was the fact that this was literally Britain's last army, which had to be preserved - and was. Faced by a superior German army (an equally underrated aspect of the conflict) the chosen path for a force made up of largely untested conscripts included heavy use of firepower via artillery and the air force. Ironically, while many critics, including the Americans, failed to recognise what was going on, the Germans were on the ball and called it Materielschlacht.

Some of the chapters were, for me, page-turners as I trod unfamiliar ground and Hart deserves much praise: hopefully future historians will be less biased and present the Normandy conflict and the European consequences more accurately. The only reason I have not given this book 5 stars is because of the poor style. If you can cope with that, this book is a rare treat and genuine eye-opener.

Balanced assessment of British combat performance in Normandy
Too much military history around Normandy eulogises German tactical perfomance and either eulogises or castigates Montgomery's generalship. This study rebuts these simplifications and paints an interesting and insightful picture into how the British Army had to fight in Normandy. The book discusses how the political concerns and higher strategic imperatives influenced the operational methods Montgomery stamped on 21st Army Group. The central tenets of Montgomery's command and operational style are dissected and examined in light of his practice. Overall, the author concludes that the British were right not to try and match the Germans tactically and were right to conduct their operations in the manner in which they did. Additionally, the author shows that Montgomery's subordinates - Dempsey and Crerar - where not the ciphers they are so often portrayed as and also highlights Montgomery's failings. These are important conclusions and deserve to be widely read.
Again, like other reviewers, this only gets four stars because of a)the author's style, which is a bit dry and b)annoying proofreading and typographical errors. That said, if you have any interest in World War II, this book should be on your bookshelf.