Forward into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the near Future
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Average customer review:Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #795617 in Books
- Published on: 1992-11
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Binding: Paperback
- 240 pages
Customer Reviews
A Big Step to the Front...
Paddy Griffth's 'Forward into Battle' was a significant, ambitious - even ground breaking - study which looks at tactics of various periods in a new light. Specifically it consists of four main essays: on Wellington's troops in the Napoleonic era; the 'empty battlefield'; the role of the tank, and Vietnam. At the time of publication it was highly innovative, and remains controversial. As its author was a Sandhurst lecturer it has doubtless also had influence on the 'real world' as well as being of purely academic interest.
Unashamedly revisionist throughout the thread that connects all the periods mentioned is that new technologies did not at any time extinguish the 'human contribution' - moreover failures of military morale or political will could have catastrophic consequences. A reasoned argument that movement remains important, even in the face of more destructive weaponry, similarly runs as a current through the work. There is also much here to counterweight what have become historical cliches, as for example the incorrect notion that Wellington always fought defensively and that his troops relied on firepower alone. The whole thing is an entertaining, engaging, and thoroughly thought provoking read.
Being a cautious reviewer who gives five stars only in the most extraordinary circumstances I have fought shy of going 'the whole hog' for one or two reasons which may seem pedantic, but could be significant. The first is that (with hindsight admittedly) we know that some of the ideas have been much more fully developed since the 1980s - not least by Griffith himself. Secondly There is something of a tendency to assume that the reader is already well informed - and knows and believes the 'established notions' which are being so well dismantled.
Nevertheless this is a significant book, an inspiration, and bears its genuine scholarship lightly, making it accessible and even fun to read. Anyone who has pretentions to know something of this field should be acquainted with 'Forward into Battle' even if they disagree with its conclusions. Highly recommended.
Lies and nonsense about warfare
This is an incredibly bad book.
Paddy Griffith has a universal theory of tactics: you charge straight at the enemy, displaying your bravery. This causes the people on the other side get scared and run away. He also has a historical agenda: to convince people that British generals of the First World War such as Field Marshall Sir Douglas, Earl Haig, were not incompetent butchers, madmen, and liars.
Alas, the theory of tactics isn't true, and neither is the agenda. People in combat only get scared when they think they might get hurt. Even when they're scared, they frequently stick around and fight. As a result, a lot of people get hurt, or killed. As for WWI generalship, most British commanders were unfit to command anything.
But if Griffith dealt with these facts in a straightforward way, he'd have to explain that hundreds of thousands of British soldiers in WWI were REPEATEDLY ordered to march slowly toward the the enemy, creating not fear but just a large target, dying for nothing. Apparently this truth is too painful for him to acknowledge.
So instead, we get fantasy. In chapter two, for example, Griffith tells us that Wellington's troops typically fired their muskets at the enemy for the sole purpose of making a loud noise, did one volley only, then walked forward shouting and waving their bayonets in the air. Supposedly,this display panicked their opponents, despite the fact that no one had actually been hurt (Well, after all, they were only frenchmen, what would you expect?).
As evidence of this, Griffith shows the British officers arguing over what ammunition was the most effective (p42), but discounting mere noise as ineffective (p 25 & 27); presents data from 19 battles, in which AT LEAST 74% (14/19) featured more than one musket volley (p39); quotes eyewitnesses saying British musketry "carried destruction into the heart of the French line (p36)," or "produced a commencement of carnage and destruction (p18);" and by showing several cases where muskets alone broke the French (p23 & 25), but none where the redcoats used noise and swagger alone.
What, you say that evidence completely contradicts Griffith's claim of harmless scare tactics? Congratulations, you can read! Apparently, Griffith can't.
Such nonsense continues throughout the book. In Ch. 3, Griffith claims that battlefields from 1808 to 1915 were really much like WWII, with soldiers trying to be invisible, and anonymous firefights the order of the day. Thus, everyone could reasonably expect that the tactics of WWI would be rather like the tactics of the Napoleonic Wars. Aside from the fact that it completely contradicts the claims of Ch. 2, it's also false. In Ch. 4 we find out that tanks are almost harmless, and that what was really important in WWI was the new infantry tactics developed by all armies 'after the begining of the Battle of the Somme.' This contradicts ch. 3, and is also inaccurate (the new tactics were developed by the Germans in 1915, with the Allies acting later; tanks were what won the war for the Allies). In ch. 5, we hear how ineffective USAmerican technology was in Viet Nam, compared to N. Vietnamese guts. This undoubtedly explains why the U.S. won every battle, the Viet Cong guerillas were wiped out, and S. Viet Nam was conquered in 1975 by an armored force with more tanks than Hitler used to invade Russia.
And btw, although Griffith frequently cites original sources, he does so unreliably. When I checked some of them, they often said quite different things then Griffith wants you to believe they said. But that's not surprising, considering how often the evidence he reprints contradicts his own judgements.
We've only scratched the surface of Griffith's misrepresentations, but I don't have space to refute every page of the book. It's a pity, really. Griffith has read, or at least looked at, a great deal of material on tactics and combat. There are times it looks like he might have very interesting and important things to say about men in battle, if he allowed himself to think clearly. As it is, the only useful part of the book is the notes and bibliography. You can learn some truths about tactics from the information there. Pity that Griffith didn't.




