Product Description

In this pathbreaking work, now available in paperback, Charles Tilly challenges all previous formulations of state development in Europe. Specifically, Tilly charges that most available explanations fail because they do not account for the great variety of kinds of states which were viable at different stages of European history, and because they assume a unilinear path of state development resolving in today′s national state.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #57014 in Books
• Published on: 1993-02-25
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 288 pages

Review
"Closely argued and thought–provoking book." Economic History Review

"Tilly′s thesis is presented with great lucidity... contributed to perform a service not merely for historians, but for mankind." French History

"An important, provocative theory, with much originality and richly documented .... extremely well written." American Journal of Sociology

"This is a good and important book. It is well written, and it presents the complex history of European state formation over a time span of one thousand years in a most understandable way. With a profound knowledge of history and an amazing compository skill, Tilly takes his readers by the hand and leads them." International Review of Social History

From the Back Cover
This is at once an account and an explanation of the evolution of European states during the present millennium. The central problem addressed by the author concerns the great variety in the kinds of state that have prevailed in Europe since AD 990.

Professor Tilly shows how interactions between the wielders of power on the one hand and the manipulators of capital on the other resulted in three state formations each of which prevailed over long periods – tribute–taking empires, systems of fragmented sovereignty, and national states. he argues that to conceive European state development as a simple, unilinear process is untenable, and further that relations between the states themselves are a big factor in their formation and evolution. The final part of the book then applies these insights to the history of Third World states since 1945.

For the paperback edition the author has made minor revisions throughout and provided an additional section on the rapid changes that have recently taken place in Central and Eastern Europe.

"An Important, provocative theory, with much originality and richly documented...it is extremely well written, despite containing both theory and a wealth of empirical information. It caries substantial learning lightly."
––Michael Mann, American Journal of Sociology

"Admirable...Thoughtful and scrupulous."
––Basil Davidson, Journal of International Affairs

"Admirers of Charles Tilly′s work on European history will now have even more to admire – another genuine breakthrough. ... Straightforward, enlightened, and powerful."
––Jack A. Goldstone, Contemporary Sociology

About the Author
Charles Tilly is University Distinguished Professor at the New School for Social Research, where he directs the Centre for Studies of Social Change.

Customer Reviews

A difficult but highly rewarding read
In these days of historical specialization, a comprehensive treatment of any subject is most welcome, whatever its faults. Tilly has indeed set himself a daunting task, namely to explain the development of state formation in Europe over the last millennium; specifically, he seeks to explain why a pattern of divergent state formations ultimately converged in the form of the modern nation-state. To the chagrin of social scientists, he assumes that war has always been the central object of the state; economic/political determinism is complementary but subordinate. Given that the nation-state has enjoyed the greatest military success throughout the centuries, all states have been forced either to move in that direction or cease to exist.

Tilly makes many good points. He reminds us that rulers did not operate with a specific plan of state formation in mind--they created states only in conjunction with certain of their subjects. Given geographic and temporal circumstances, rulers could only pursue increasingly costly military ventures by bargaining with power blocks within their subject population for the necessary resources--soldiers, rations, etc. Where capital was not accumulated and concentrated, the balance of power lay with landowners. Where a city had emerged with a concentration of capital, proto-capitalists held power. Where capital was unavailable, the ruler could resort to methods of coercion of his subjects. Political and economic conditions dictated the bargaining terms with which the ruler sought to win support for his military goals. Tilly argues that different combinations of coercion and capital created diverse types of states. As the demands of war increased, the power blocks which rulers depended on gained more and more advantage over them, thus winning for themselves concessions that increased their standing in the state's government. In effect, the era of bureaucratization was born. The means of capitalization and coercion were incorporated into the structure of the state, and thus was born the nation-state. Essentially, the nation-state has proven to be the best at mobilizing and fighting wars, leading lesser states to either emulate it or risk being conquered by it.

Tilly offers a somewhat simplistic argument, acknowledging the criticisms he duly expects will come. State formation is portrayed as little more than an afterthought of warmongering. The accumulation of royal concessions in time laid the foundation for permanent infrastructure. By seeking revenues and compliance from a subject population, rulers eventually found themselves having to provide for their subjects' welfare--via production, distribution, transportation, etc. In the most modern states, social spending now outweighs military spending; this has served to shorten the length of wars while greatly increasing their intensity. A major contribution of this book is its implication that social history by itself does not explain the emergence of modern states and societies. Some will find Tilly's simplistic model untenable, but I find it quite logical and compelling. His argument (and the wealth of resources on which he draws) certainly warrants serious thought on the part of the reader.