Product Description

An in-depth study of Douglas Haig's army commanders on the Western Front during the First World War. Assesses their careers and characters, looks critically at their performance in command and examines their relationship with their subordinates and with Haig himself. Chapters are devoted to Allenby, Byng, Birdwood, Gough, Horne, Monro, Plumer, Rawlinson and Smith-Dorrien. Offers a fascinating insight into the mentality of these men and into their methods as they sought a solution to the problem of war on the Western Front. A fascinating and original contribution to the history of the war in the trenches.

Contributors include:

John Bourne, Matthew Hughes, John Lee, William Philpott, Simon Robbins, Gary Sheffield, Peter Simkins, Ian F. W. Beckett, Steven J. Corvi.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #349305 in Books
• Published on: 2006-01-19
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 224 pages

Customer Reviews

A rounded view of military corporate management
For those who subscribe to the "Haig was an incompetent butcher" opinion, this book will perhaps open minds and bring the realities of Haig's situation into focus.
No doubt Haig had shortcomings. Who of us has not? However this book draws the reader into obvious comparisons with how any CEO would run a large organisation. The permanent dilemma between exercising strong personal control over detail or allowing able and proven subordinates to make and take decisions, was ever present for Haig. Taking the Corporation analogy forward, he had to balance the opinions and plans of his subordinates with the ever present (and changing) demands of an untrusting Chairman of the Board (Lloyd George).
This book allows the reader to follow the tactical plans offered by Haig's generals with the strategic world in which Haig was compelled to live. Demanding more of Rawlinson's plans for the Somme than perhaps tactical objectives suggested appropriate. Pushing Plumer to continue at 3rd Ypres when 20/20 hindsight offered alternatives.
The common thread is that Haig's ability to wage war effectively was conditioned by the destruction and eventual re-creation of the British Army into the magnificent and very large fighting force of 1918 that eventually carried him through to victory. Also the politicians and the technology and tactics, all of which were not in harmony until after March 1918. These essays on Haig's Generals will assist any battle guide or researcher seeking to give colour to the men behind the reputations.

Mike McCarthy
Editor, 'The Battle Guide'
Guild of Battlefield Guides

Useful study of men at war
By mid 1916 the British forces in France and Flanders were so large that they had been subdivided into five Armies, each larger than the original BEF that had sailed in August 1914. It curious that the men who led these Armies, and their chiefs of staff, have been rather neglected when it comes to scholarly biographies and analyses. Although several of them wrote autobiographies or memoirs, few have received more than a passing interest. Horne, commander of First Army, had nothing at all about him until quite recently; Byng and Plumer were subjects of single good modern biographies only in the last two decades; Monro and Birdwood get hardly a mention; only Rawlinson and Gough have received significant attention and one suspects that has been more driven by their failures than by their successes.

Rather like "Haig: a reappraisal 80 years on" that I recently reviewed, this is a collection of papers, one covering each General in turn, by leading contemporary historians including Gary Sheffield, Simon Robbins, John Bourne and Peter Simpkins. The various studies examine the background and temperament of the man, his relationships with Haig, his peers, staffs and subordinates.

Some themes will serve to frustrate the "lions led by donkeys" school. These men were experienced soldiers, who rose to their command through demonstration of capability. Their backgrounds and personalities varied greatly, with inevitable consequences for their relationships and actions. Two were sacked (Gough perhaps unfairly in 1918, although there is a case that he should have gone much earlier; Allenby in 1917, sidelined to Palestine where he turned out rather well), one more at least (Plumer) came close to the same fate. Rawlinson's development from a less than wonderful 1915 and a disastrous 1 July 1916 to a capable, flexible, wise, leader in 1918 is covered well: as indeed are all of the stories.

I was intrigued by a surprising weight given to secondary sources in some of the papers, but this may have been due to tight writing timetables or small research budgets. I would not rely on this book as my single source of information about a General, but as a taster and a guide to where to look more deeply, it can not really be faulted. All papers are scrupulous in their citation of sources, as you might expect from professional academic historians.

There is a small collection of photographs, none of which you will not have seen before, and insertion of a few largely irrelevant maps. This book is not about trenches and battle timelines. It is about men and their struggle to overcome the unprecedented challenges of technology, communications and huge organisational scale and in that most stressful and unforgiving period in our history.