Decision in Normandy
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Average customer review:Product Description
An account of how two years of intense, detailed planning reached its successful conclusion when the Allied forces took the beaches of Normandy on D Day. But the 76-day campaign that followed, the Allies' crucial bid for a toehold in western Europe, was one of the bloodiest of World War II.
Product Details
- Amazon Sales Rank: #1088508 in Books
- Published on: 2000-06-15
- Original language: English
- Binding: Hardcover
- 552 pages
Editorial Reviews
Review
The celebrated controversies of the Normandy campaign painstakingly and impartially reexamined - with reference to both Omar Bradley's recent, posthumous, anti-Monty autobiography and the forthcoming, applicable volume of Nigel Hamilton's authorized Montgomery biography (in addition to earlier histories and memoirs). This, in short, is for those deeply involved in the historiography, as well as the history, of WW II's climactic campaign - and apt to confuse, mislead, or discountenance others. (On the lowest level, non-controversial events, however dramatic or consequential - like the Omaha landing - rate a bare mention.) Much of what D'Este treats as controversial has yielded over time to a consensus: no historian today, in the most important instance, takes seriously Montgomery's claim that - despite British failure to secure Caen (and other miscalculations) - the Normandy campaign followed his master plan. D'Este, however, is interested not only in the truth or falsity of the "myth," but in its every aspect. On military grounds, he argues that Monty never intended the master plan as other than a framework, or course of action - but he notes, on psychological grounds, that Monty could not admit error. ("Contrary to the popular misconception fostered by Montgomery himself," moreover, "he did know and understand that no battle ever goes completely according to plan.") D'Este contrasts British "rigidity and inflexibility" with American readiness to improvise. Looking backward, he asks if the plan might have succeeded. (No: Too little attention had been given to breaking out of the beachheads, or to alternatives around Caen; too little credit had been given to the Germans.) Focusing on the history of the myth, he asks why Eisenhower didn't immediately scotch it and also why it got into the official British military history. Another, quite different concern is Churchill's reputed "lack of enthusiasm for a Second Front," Here, D'Este doesn't pretend to have any final answers - but he cites an Eisenhower misinterpretation of a Churchill Britishism as one key source for that belief. Some of his points are very fine indeed (unmerited criticism of a particular British company in a particular engagement); some points he magnifies (why SHAEF headquarters were set up in remote Granville "is one of the great mysteries of the war"). But again and again he reveals new facets of familiar subjects - in part from his own dual, American army and British academic background; in part by querying everyone and everything. Cognoscenti will peruse the footnotes as closely as the text. (Kirkus Reviews)
Customer Reviews
The product of a historian on the top of his game
At the risk of duplicating other reviews, I would recommend this work- and the rest of d'Este's- to anybody. After finishing An Army At Dawn which seemed to largely be serving a jingoistic, patriotic agenda despite the wealth of references cited, I was wary of another American historian writing of British involvement. D'Este is in another class- thoughtful, considered, fair minded and incisive, as well as being a fine writer. Seek out this work, and anything else the man writes.
Excellent
At long last a book on the Normandy campaign that presents a well researched thesis without the pro and anti Montgomery hysteria that accompanies many books on the subject. D'Este portrays a logical and balanced view, he criticises when justified and praises when warranted.It is without a doubt the best book I have read on the Normandy campaign.
An excellent critical and detailed account
Mr. D'Este's book is the best overall account of the Normandy campaign of the 8 to 10 I have read so far. The near exhaustive research of primary materials comes through without encumbering his very readable account (it includes extensive source footnotes). This is not just another presentation of the events but an in-depth analysis of the debates on strategy and operations that took place within the Allied high command. His critical view of certain commanders, notably Montgomery, is fair and well supported. Mr. D'Este has produced a book that should certainly be a reference to all historians in terms of his style and adherence to strict, documented and referenced historical analysis.




