Product Description

Focusing on 1916, this work examines the actions of the principal commanders as they sought for a way to win the war and opted for the deadly notion of attrition: the notion that it was only possible to win by killing a vast quantity of soldiers. It points at the failure of high command to to realize that until new offensive technology was invented to overcome the current bias of defensive technology, the death toll could only rise.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #402969 in Books
• Published on: 2001-11-16
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Hardcover
• 346 pages

Review
Two million men died on the Western Front in 1916, mostly in the vast, inconclusive battles of Verdun and the Somme. Traditionally, the blame has been laid on the commanders, notably Sir Douglas Haig, who found themselves following the theory of attrition - effectively, trying to kill as many men as possible (with consequent massive casualties on one's own side) in the hope of wearing the enemy down. Neillands's main aim is to come to terms with the myths and questions about the nature of attrition. Initially, he explores the course of the war before 1916. Then by scrutinizing the war plans of the various commanders he re-examines their reputations. To a large extent Neillands defends Haig and his policies, pointing out that Haig's subsequent loss of popularity was largely due to Lloyd George's low opinion of him. Overall, Neillands sympathizes with the problems of pre-war preparation and because of it the lack of supplies, which in particular made a war of attrition more prolonged. As the memoirs of van Falkenhayn, the German commander, show, 'what he [van Falkenhayn] desired was costing Germany as many men as France'. Unquestionably, Neillands's strength is his ability to guide the reader, retelling assumptions only to dismiss them with carefully balanced argument This is most apparent in the concluding chapter, 'Recriminations', where he relies upon American historian Barbara Tuchman to back his view of Haig. Put simply, it was government policy and not the commanders who precipitated the need for attrition. (Kirkus UK)

Synopsis
Focusing on 1916, this work examines the actions of the principal commanders as they sought for a way to win the war and opted for the deadly notion of attrition: the notion that it was only possible to win by killing a vast quantity of soldiers. It points at the failure of high command to to realize that until new offensive technology was invented to overcome the current bias of defensive technology, the death toll could only rise.

About the Author
Robin Neillands is an acclaimed author of military history. Previous titles include Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914-1918; The Conquest of the Reich; The Desert Rats and The Hundred Years War.