Product Description

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than about counterinsurgency. This volume was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. A new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual" will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come.

Product Details

• Amazon Sales Rank: #24085 in Books
• Published on: 2007-09-07
• Original language: English
• Number of items: 1
• Binding: Paperback
• 472 pages

Review
"This is the definitive guide as to how the U.S. military plans to address what is likely to be the dominant form of warfare over the next decade." - Andrew Krepinevich, author of The Army and Vietnam "Surely a manual that's on the bedside table of the president, vice president, secretary of defense, 21 of 25 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and many others deserves a place at your bedside too." - Lt. General David H. Petraeus"

Customer Reviews

A benchmark for judging the US and UK military in Iraq
Written as a handbook for US soldiers in overseas operations who are trying to control local resistance, it is a practical management guide.

The real interest for the general reader is how much of it applies to the current occupation of Iraq. This is a "how to" guide to dealing with insurgents, building positive relationships with local populations, strengthing the institutions of government and maintaining human rights under extreme pressure. It contains the principles against which the US army's behaviour should be judged, and by which it should judge itself.

Given the recent (August 2007) arguments in the UK about protecting interpreters, Appendix C on Linguistic Support set out in clear, practical terms how important it is that those who provide that critical service to an occupying force need and deserve protection. That part at least should be essential reading for UK government ministers.

If you are interested in Iraq and want some insight into military thinking, this is an excellent read.

How it should be done?
An interesting book (manual) on how the US Military hoped to tackle insurgents. You wont find this an interesting read as in a history book on the fall of Berlin for example, but it is interesting as a book on current times and theories on modern warfare.
Anyone interested in military operations and or history will get a lot from this book.

More of how it should be done rather than how it was done. Some interesting points raised in the first few chapters was the knowledge of the higher loss of friendlies is inevitable at the beginning of a COIN while networks of informers and befriending the populous is established. But as most modem wars are fought by politicians who want next to zero friendly casualties this can be counter productive to a COIN as enemies are made from a friendly populous due to inappropriate use of firepower.

Maybe a few in command and in politics need this book slap in their face?

they wrote it but didn't read it
The information and guidance in this field manual is hard to fault. The US military (particularly its Marine Corps and Special Forces)has long and hard-won experience in counterinsurgency and this manual reflects that. Unfortunately too many of those who conceive and plan military operations have no such experience and neither time nor inclination to read Field Manuals. Academics, students and journalists should read this manual, if only to ponder why so much of it was ignored or over-ridden in the high-level planning phase. Counterinsurgency was an almost forgotten art until the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan - this manual is useful in reminding us of three things above all. Firstly of the complexity of such operations; secondly, that the military role is only a part of the whole; and finally, that the insurgent is not so much outfought as out-thought.